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Well Papa go to bed now it's getting late
Nothing we can say can change anything now
Because there's just different people coming down here now
and they see things in different ways
And soon everything we've known will just be swept away.'
INTRODUCTION
In the face of persistent, often virulent attacks in the popular press,2 as well as
academia,3 the critical study of the impact of race on the social fabric of the
United States continues. Despite the rich analysis of race in critical scholarship,
a body of law chock full of insights remains largely unexplored.4 Immigration
law traditionally has been considered a specialty area of practitioners spumed by
academics. However, the treatment of "aliens," particularly noncitizens of color,
under the U.S. immigration laws reveals volumes about domestic race relations
in the nation. A deeply complicated, often volatile, relationship exists between
racism directed toward citizens and that aimed at noncitizens. Peter Brimelow's
anti-immigrant book, Alien Nation,5 exemplifies this relationship; while
ostensibly criticizing the state of U.S. immigration law, the book attacks
affirmative action, "Hispanics," multiculturalism, bilingual education, and
virtually any program designed to remedy discrimination in the United States.
As the legacy of chattel slavery and forced migration from Africa would have
it, the United States has a long history of treating racial minorities in the United
States harshly, at times savagely. Noncitizen racial minorities, as foreigners not
part of the national community, generally have been subject to similar cruelties
1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Independence Day, on THE RIVER (Columbia Records 1980).
2. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7, at 46
(reviewing BeyondAll Reason by Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry); Neil A. Lewis, For
Black Scholars Wedded to Prism ofRace, New and Separate Goals, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997,
at B9; Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (reviewing
BeyondAll Reason); Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996,
at 27.
3. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON (1997);
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1989); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992);
see also Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Baclash, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1467, 1471-72 (1996) (observing that Critical Race Theory has been the subject of
"'attack' scholarship" designed "to preempt and shut down debate").
4. There are, of course, some works that consider the relationship between immigration
and race relations. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric ofAssimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven
Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1993).
5. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION (1995).
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but also have suffered deportation,6 indefinite detention,7 and more. The
differential treatment is permitted, if not encouraged, by the disparate bundles
of legal rights afforded domestic minorities and noncitizen minorities.
In analyzing the treatment of noncitizens in the United States, immigration law
offers an invaluable vantage point because of its unique characteristics vis-a-vis
traditional constitutional law. The so-called "plenary power" doctrine, which
historically has shielded substantive immigration judgments by the political
branches of government from meaningful judicial review, bestows great
discretion on the U.S. Government to establish rules regulating the admission of
noncitizens into the country.' Born in an era when Congress acted with a
vengeance to exclude Chinese immigrants from this nation's shores,9 the plenary
power doctrine remains the law, though perhaps narrowed somewhat in scope.' °
Moreover, the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to permit the federal
government, and at times the states, to discriminate against immigrants with the
lawful right to remain permanently in this country."
In sharp contrast to the limited constitutional rights of noncitizens, citizens
enjoy a full array of protections under the Constitution and a multitude of other
laws. 2 Racial minorities, for example, may rely on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge discriminatory governmental action"
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fight racism in the workplace.' 4 Although the
6. Cf Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (emphasizing that deportation of a
noncitizen "may result in the loss 'of all that makes life worth living') (quoting Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
7. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane) (holding
that the Attorney General had legal authority to indefinitely detain a Cuban noncitizen whom
Cuba refused to allow to return).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 231-41 (describing doctrine).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54 (analyzing genesis of plenary power doctrine
in Chinese exclusion cases).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 231-41 (discussing modem significance of doctrine);
see, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (upholding gender and legitimacy
classifications in immigration laws); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to denial of nonimmigrant visa to Marxist academic on
ideological grounds); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1967) (allowing exclusion of
homosexuals). .
11. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-84 (1976) (upholding discrimination against
lawful permanent residents in federal medical benefits program); infra note 235 (citing
decisions permitting states to discriminate between citizens and lawful permanent residents).
12. For a communitarian critique of the proliferation of rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK (1991).
13. See. e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); cf United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-58 (1996) (holding that Virginia's exclusion of women from
Virginia Military Institute violated Equal Protection Clause). The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, offers uncertain protections to noncitizens. See infra text accompanying notes 41-46
(analyzing law in this regard).
14. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct 843 (1997) (reversing dismissal of Title
VII claim alleging racial discrimination by employer). In contrast, the Supreme Court held that
Title VII does not bar discrimination on the basis of alienage status. See Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
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close of the twentieth century has been marked by rollbacks in legal protections
for minorities, 5 the law, at least in theory, serves to protect discrete and insular
minorities from the excesses of the political process. 6
Rather than just a peculiar feature of U.S. public law, the differential treatment
of citizens and noncitizens serves as a "magic mirror" revealing how dominant
society might treat domestic minorities if legal constraints were abrogated.
Indeed, the harsh treatment of noncitizens of color reveals terrifying lessons
about how society views citizens of color. For example, the era of exclusion of
Chinese immigrants in the 1800s occurred almost simultaneously with punitive,
often violent, action against the Chinese on the West Coast. 7 Efforts to exclude
and deport Mexican citizens from the United States, which accelerated over the
course of the twentieth century, tell much about how society generally views
Mexican American citizens.' Similarly, the extraordinarily harsh policies
directed toward poor, Black, Haitian persons, seeking refuge from violent
political and economic turmoil in Haiti, leave little room for doubt-if there were
any-about how this society as a whole views its own poor Black citizens.' 9 The
out-group homogeneity thesis from psychology, in which in-groups generally
view out-groups, such as racial minorities, as homogeneous, lends support to this
insight."
Oddly enough, even while the attacks on immigrants of color pervade the
national consciousness, some informed observers claim that racism is a historical
15. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995) (holding that
all racial classifications, including those in federal program designed to foster minority
enterprise, are subject to strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
498 (1989) (invalidating city's minority business program as violation of equal protection);
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that affirmative action plan
was unlawful), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); see also
infra note 23 (citing cases upholding end of and invalidating affirmative action programs).
16. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (recognizing
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry");
see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980) (exploring importance of
Carolene Products's footnote 4 to constitutional theory of judicial review). This is not to
suggest that legal remedies for minorities have proven to be problem-free. Some argue that
liberalism's belief that law will promote meaningful social change is misplaced. See, e.g.,
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL (1992) (contending that racism is endemic
to United States); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS (1994)
(analyzing limits of achieving social reform through law); George A. Martinez, Legal
Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-
1980,27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 555 (1994) (analyzing limits of litigation in achieving meaningful
social change for Mexican Americans in the United States).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 47-54 (analyzing circumstances surrounding Chinese
exclusion).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 150-78 (scrutinizing U.S. Government's efforts to
exclude and deport Mexican immigrants as well as Mexican American citizens).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 179-206 (evaluating significance of Haitian
interdiction and repatriation for African Americans in the United States).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 258-60 (discussing theory).
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artifact in the United States, 21 or at least has greatly diminished as a driving force
behind policymaking as the twentieth century comes to a close?2 Based in part
on this premise, political forces attack affirmative action,23 multiculturalism,24
language minorities,' and ameliorative programs created in response to the civil
rights struggles of the 1960s. At the same historical moment, Congress, with
minimal resistance, has passed increasingly restrictive immigration laws, in the
name of fighting a range of social ills from welfare fraud to crime to terrorism
to "illegal" immigration?6 This Article contends that the fact that anti-immigrant
sentiment caught fire in tandem with the anti-minority backlash in the United
States is no coincidence.
Besides analyzing the history surrounding legal exclusions in the immigration
laws, I argue that the exclusionary laws reveal majority sentiment about racial
minorities in the United States. Subordination of Asian immigrants and the use
of quotas to exclude racialized peoples,27 among other devices, evolved into more
21. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 3, 22-24 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963, 1966 (1996) (book
review) ("Racism in the United States has declined dramatically in recent decades, despite
frequent denials of this fact. I believe... that [though arguable] racism as such no longer
plays a crucial role in immigration law; certainly it plays a less significant role than it did
before 1965.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
23. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir.) (rejecting
constitutional challenges to California's Proposition 209, which prohibits consideration of race
and gender in any state program), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir.) (holding that affirmative action by the University of Texas in law
school admissions violated Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
24. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1992)
(contending that multiculturalism is destructive force in the United States); see also J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE (1997) (contending that ethnic separatism threatens
the nation).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 226-28 (discussing speak-English-only rules).
26. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, §§ 501-553, 110 Stat. 3009, 3670-81 (limiting immigration and facilitating
deportation in number of ways); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 400-451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-77 (limiting the receipt
of public benefits by legal immigrants); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 423, 502, 110 Stat. 1214, 1259, 1272 (providing, inter alia, that
noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses would receive limited or no judicial review of
deportation orders and creating a special tribunal responsible for deporting so-called terrorists).
27. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1994) (analyzing how ideology and history contribute to the construction of races). This
contextual definition of "race" is particularly appropriate in analyzing the immigration laws.
Restrictionist immigration laws historically sought to limit immigration of groups of persons
today thought of as "white ethnics," such as Jewish or Irish immigrants, because they were of
a different "race." See infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text Moreover, the international
law on which the asylum and refugee provisions of the U.S. immigration laws permitting
persons fleeing persecution on account of race are based, see Immigration & Nationality Act,
ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended), §§ 101(a)(42), 241(b)(3) (codifed at 8 U.S.C.A. §§
1101(a)(42), 123 l(b)(3) (West 1970 & Supp. 1998)), requires a liberal definition of "race." See
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 68, at 18 (re-edited ed. 1992) (offering
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subtle forms of exclusion with the transformation of racial sensibilities in
modern times. Besides analyzing the treatment of minorities under the
immigration laws, this Article posits that the harsh treatment of immigrants of
color suggests how this nation might treat citizens of color if afforded the
opportunity. Absent the Constitution and other legal protections, domestic
minorities could expect no better treatment than their foreign brothers and sisters.
This is no idle concern. Not all that long ago, the United States Supreme Court
declared that African Americans "had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect."28 Though racial sensibilities have changed, this nation at times has
denied rights to racial minorities. To avoid the repetition of such events,
everyone, not just immigrant rights activists and immigration law scholars,
concerned with race relations in the United States should take interest in the
exclusionary aspects of our immigration laws.
This Article, however, is more than simply a summary of how racism has
infected immigration law and policy in the United States and how citizens as well
as noncitizens should be gravely concerned. It instead demonstrates how the
harsh treatment of noncitizens reveals just how this society views citizens of
color. As psychological theory suggests, the virulent attacks on noncitizens in
effect represent transference and displacement of animosity for racial minorities
generally. 9 Because direct attacks on minorities on account of their race is
nowadays taboo, frustration with domestic minorities is displaced to foreign
minorities. A war on noncitizens of color focusing on their immigration status,
not race, as conscious or unconscious cover, serves to vent social frustration and
hatred." Hatred for domestic minorities is displaced to an available, more
publicly palatable, target for antipathy. These psychological devices help society
reconcile the view that "U.S. society is not racist" with the harsh treatment of
noncitizens of color. Noncitizens, so the story goes, deserve different treatment
because of their immigration status, not race.
Psychological theory also helps explain some historical oddities about U.S.
society's seemingly contradictory treatment of different minority groups,
particularly African Americans, and groups historically classified as "foreign,"
such as Asian Americans and Latinos. Congress passed the anti-Chinese
exclusionary laws in the 1800s on the heels of the abolition of slavery and the
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, ostensibly intended to eliminate
interpretive guidance on relevant international law and stating that "[r]ace ... has to be
understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as 'races'
in common usage").
28. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 261-88 (analyzing psychological theory as tool for
understanding relationship between anti-immigrant and anti-minority sentiment).
30. See, e.g., BRINELOW, supra note 5. Though ostensibly complaining about immigrants
and immigration, Brimelow expresses deeper frustrations with multiculturalism, affirmative
action, and race relations in the United States. See Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien
Nation": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Summer 1996, at 111,
113-17 (criticizing Brimelow's analysis of these issues).
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all vestiges of this nation's "peculiar institution."'" What legal rights the country
formally extended to Blacks, it ruthlessly denied Chinese immigrants. Similarly,
a landmark achievement for African Americans, Brown v. Board of Education,2
and its rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine, was decided the same year
that the U.S. Government commenced "Operation Wetback," a massive campaign
resulting in the deportation of tens of thousands of Mexican immigrants, as well
as U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.33 Both examples reflect the appearance of
generosity toward African Americans, on the one hand, and a crackdown against
"foreigners" on the other. When law constrained attacks on the domestic
minority, animosity was displaced to foreign minorities in our midst and it our
borders. Maintenance of the racial status quo serves as the unifying theme
explaining these historical phenomena.3 4
One might wonder why interrelationships such as these have gone unexplored
to this point. The subordination of non-Black racial minorities often has
remained invisible.3" Issues of race, being parsed into hues of Black and white,
31. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION at vii (1956); see infra text
accompanying notes 69-82 (analyzing relationship between these historical developments).
32. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 150-78 (considering various anti-Mexican
campaigns, including infamous "Operation Wetback").
34. See generally TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994) (analyzing central organizing principle of white
supremacy in race relations in California); REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY
(1981) (analyzing importance of belief of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority to doctrine of
Manifest Destiny).
Nothing in this Article should be read to suggest that racial discrimination is the exclusive
factor shaping the U.S. immigration laws. Rather, as I analyze in other work, see, e.g., Kevin
R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's
Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629, 650-51 (1995), other factors not directly linked to race, such as concerns with the
perceived costs of immigration and its impact on the labor market, obviously have influenced
the development of the immigration laws. Nor does the Article take the extreme position that
every immigration law, intentionally or not, discriminates against racial minorities. Rather, I
modestly contend that race has influenced-and continues to influence-U.S. immigration law
and policy. Consequently, this Article analyzes how race, as one variable in a complex
multivariate equation, has affected the policymaking process and studies the relationship
between exclusionary immigration laws and the civil rights of domestic racial minorities.
35. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1997) (book review).
"The Black/white framing of race issues must give way to a fuller, more differentiated
understanding of a multiracial, multiethnic society divided along the lines of race, class,
gender, and other axes in order to... contribute to the long-term empowerment of [racial
minorities]." Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and
Construction, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 196, 196-97 (Robert
Gooding-Williams ed., 1993); see Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration:
Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 64
(1995) (noting "tendency... to frame civil rights as an almost exclusively black/white issue")
(footnote omitted); Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy, and
Affirmative Action: A Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 891, 925 (1997) ("Race
relations in this country are extremely complex. White supremacy is experienced by non-white
1998] 1117
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have obscured the relationship between various forms of subordination of
different racial minorities.36 In moving beyond this vision of race relations, we
must take care not to "dilute or obscure ... [the] claims and interests [of African
Americans]."3 This Article contends that it is impossible to fully appreciate the
subordination of any particular racial minority group without understanding the
oppression of all minority groups.38 To this end, Part I of the Article analyzes the
long history of racial and national origin exclusion in the immigration laws. Part
II focuses on the teachings of this exclusionary history for minority citizens as
well as noncitizens.
In the end, we peer into a heart of darkness where the deepest fears of racial
minorities-that a majority of society desires and has consistently strived for
Anglo-Saxon homogeneity and hegemony-are demonstrated to be more than
justified. One is left to ponder the frailties of the human condition, what we are
as a society, and the possibilities, if any, for racial harmony in the twenty-first
groups in different ways in different geographic regions under different historical conditions.")
(emphasis in original).
36. George A. Martinez has made this point from a philosophical perspective. See George
A. Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction ofRace: Toward an Epistemic
Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. (forthcoming 1998); see also Angela P. Harris, The
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741,774-78 (1994) (contending that Critical
Race Theory, which has tended to focus on African American subordination, may benefit from
the study of subordination of women, lesbians and gay men, Asian Americans, Latinos,
indigenous peoples, and the poor); cf Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997) (describing how "systems" analysis in non-legal disciplines
applies to study of law).
37. John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay
for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free ", 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 61 (1997); see Leslie
Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the
Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1596-605 (1997) (articulating case for "black
exceptionalism," that is, the uniqueness of the African American experience in the United
States).
38. I elaborate on this argument in Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans
and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347
(1997). Two examples help illustrate the central point. The U.S.-Mexican War, which
culminated in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, resulted from expansionist desires,
including the hope by some to protect the institution of slavery in the United States. See 1
RICHARD HOFSTADTERETAL., THE UNITED STATES 230-31 (4th ed. 1976) (noting that Whigs
contended that war was designed to expand slavery to new territories). Thus, an effort to
maintain slavery and the subjugation of African Americans, was part of a chain of events
culminating in a treaty that many claim resulted in the subordination of Mexican Americans
in the Southwest. See, e.g., RODOLFO ACufA, OCCUIIED AMERICA 28-39, 105-08 (1972);
RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GuADALUPE HIDALGO (1990);
Guadalupe T. Luna, "Agricultural Underdogs" and International Agreements: The Legal
Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 13-21
(1996). Similarly, race relations in Texas cannot be fully understood without analyzing the
history of the interactions between Anglo, Mexican American, and African American
communities; analysis of Mexican American/Anglo or African American/Anglo relations, for
example, would offer an incomplete picture. See generally NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE:
MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES IN TExAS COTTON CULTuRE (1997) (analyzing history
of race relations in central Texas).
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century. As Roberto Unger said about the legal academy, "[w]hen we came, they
were like a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs. They stood in
tedious embarrassment before cold altars. But we turned away from those altars
and found the mind's opportunity in the heart's revenge."39
I. THE HISTORY OF RACIAL EXCLUSION IN THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION LAWS
Racism, along with nativism," economic, and other social forces, has
unquestionably influenced the evolution of immigration law and policy in the
United States. It does not exist in a social and historical vacuum. Foreign and
domestic racial subordination instead find themselves inextricably linked.
In untangling this history, keep in mind critical differences between traditional
immigration law and ordinary public law. Although the Equal Protection Clause
generally requires strict scrutiny of racial classifications in the laws,4 the
Supreme Court long ago-in a decision undisturbed to this day-upheld
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in the admission of
noncitizens into the country.42 Similarly, even though discrimination on the basis
of alienage status in modern times may mask an intent to discriminate against
racial minorities,43 the Supreme Court ordinarily defers to alienage classifications
made by Congress." Because the substantive provisions of the immigration laws
39. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 119 (1986).
40. "Nativism" is the "intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its
foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections." JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 4 (2d ed.
1992). The classic historical study of nativism in the United States is id For a summary of
nativism's influence on the development of U.S. immigration laws, see Berta Esperanza
Hemdndez-TmyoI, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-
First Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1083-97 (1996).
41. See generally LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 16-14, at 1466-
74 (2d ed. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
43. Though the Supreme Court has held it impermissible to discriminate against minority
immigrants in the country, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), it must be proven
that the state actor intentionally used alienage as a proxy for race. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). This formidable burden can rarely be satisfied. See Theodore Eisenberg
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (demonstrating empirically that the discriminatory intent
requirement deters the filing of claims and results in a high loss rate for plaintiffs).
44. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,84-87 (1976). But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976) (invalidating federal civil service rule barring employment of lawful,
permanent residents). State alienage classifications sometimes have been subject to strict
scrutiny. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (applying strict
scrutiny to alienage classification in state welfare scheme), with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 294-95 (1978) (declining to apply strict scrutiny in upholding a New York requirement
that police officers be U.S. citizens).
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historically have been immune from legal constraint," the political process
allows the majority to have its way with noncitizens."
A. From Chinese Exclusion to General Asian
Subordination
The horrendous treatment of Chinese immigrants in the 1800s by federal, state,
and local governments, as well as by the public at large, represents a bitter
underside to U.S. history. 7 Culminating the federalization of immigration
regulation," Congress passed the infamous Chinese exclusion laws barring
virtually all immigration of persons of Chinese ancestry" and severely punishing
Chinese immigrants who violated the harsh laws.5" Discrimination and violence,
often rooted in class conflict as well as racist sympathies, directed at Chinese
immigrants already in the United States, particularly in California, fueled passage
of the laws.5 The efforts to exclude future Chinese immigrants from our shores
can be seen as linked to the deeply negative attitude toward Chinese persons
already in the country.
The Supreme Court emphasized national sovereignty as the rationale for not
disturbing the laws excluding the "obnoxious Chinese""2 from the United States.
In the famous Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
45. For an analysis of how the plenary power doctrine has caused courts to invoke
procedural due process norms and liberally interpret the immigration laws, see Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990), and Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
46. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political
Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139
(analyzing the vulnerability of noncitizens in the political process).
47. See generally RONALD TAKAKi, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 79-130 (1989)
(documenting the treatment of Chinese immigrants in nineteenth century America). Not willing
to be passive victims, the Chinese community aggressively posed sophisticated legal challenges
to the various state and federal barriers placed in their paths. See generally CHARLES J.
MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY (1994) (chronicling resistance).
48. See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19-43 (1996)
(tracing the shift from state to federal immigration regulation over the course of the 1800s).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing Chinese exclusion cases).
50. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233 (1896) (invalidating law providing
that a Chinese immigrant unlawfully in the country "shall be imprisoned [without ajury trial]
at hard labor").
51. See generally ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA 9-99 (1988); ELMER CLARENCE
SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (2d ed. 1991). In 1871, for
example, mob violence against Chinese persons in Los Angeles resulted in the killing of at least
18 people. See id at 48; see also DANIELS, supra, at 58-66 (describing anti-Chinese violence
on the West Coast during this period).
52. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting); see
Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposalfor Immigration Reform, STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV., Summer 1996, at 35, 43-45 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions,
denominated as the "anti-Asian cases," which upheld the Chinese exclusion laws).
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power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States, as a part of [its] sovereign powers delegated by
the Constitution."53 Similarly, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court
reasoned that "[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners ... is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into
the country." 4
Congress later extended the Chinese exclusion laws to bar immigration from
other Asian nations and to prohibit the immigration of persons of Asian ancestry
from any nation." The so-called Gentleman's Agreement between the U.S. and
Japanese Governments in 1907-08 greatly restricted immigration from Japan."
The Immigration Act of 1917 expanded Chinese exclusion to prohibit
immigration from the "Asiatic barred zone. 57 A 1924 law, best known for
creating the discriminatory national origins quota system," allowed for the
exclusion of noncitizens "ineligible to citizenship," which affected Asian
immigrants who as non-whites were prohibited from naturalizing. 9
Other aspects of the immigration and nationality laws reinforced the anti-Asian
sentiment reflected in the exclusion laws. For example, the Supreme Court
interpreted the naturalization law, which allowed "white" immigrants as well as
(after the Civil War) persons of African ancestry to naturalize, as barring Asians
from naturalizing.' In United States v. Thind,6' the Court held that an immigrant
from India was not "white" and therefore was ineligible for naturalization.
Similarly, in Ozawa v. United States,62 the Court held that a Japanese immigrant,
as a non-white, could not naturalize. This manipulation of the citizenship rights
of racial minorities harkens back to Dred Scott v. Sandford,63 in which the
53. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
54. 149 U.S. at 707.
55. For an analysis of the impact of the immigration laws on the evolution of the Asian
American community in the United States, see BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN
AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990 (1993).
56. See DANIELS, supra note 51, at 123-28.
57. Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76 (repealed 1952); see HING, supra note 55, at 32.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 97-120 (analyzing the social forces resulting in the
passage of a national origins quota system in 1924).
59. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 1 (d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952); see also
TAKAKI, supra note 47, at 209-10 (observing the impact of this restrictive exclusion ground on
immigration from Japan).
60. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996) (analyzing cases applying
the naturalization prerequisite that a noncitizen be "white"). The impact of the racial
prerequisite to the naturalization laws was ameliorated to some extent by the birthright-
citizenship rule, which bestows citizenship on virtually all persons born in the United States.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial
Restrictions on Naturalization: The Recurring Intersection of Race and Gender in Immigration
and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 142, 152-53 (1996) (reviewing White by
Law and commenting on impact of birthright citizenship on children of noncitizens born in
United States).
61. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
62. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
63. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Supreme Court held that a freed Black man was not a citizen for the purpose of
invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Incorporating the racial discrimination encoded in federal naturalization law,
state laws buttressed the racial hierarchy. A number of states, most notably
California, passed so-called "alien land laws" early in the twentieth century that
barred the ownership of certain real property by noncitizens "ineligible to
citizenship."'6 The measures were directed at Japanese immigrants, who as non-
whites barred from naturalization, were "ineligible to citizenship." The political
and social milieu in which these laws were passed demonstrates their racial
animus. For example, anti-Japanese venom dominated the campaign culminating
in the alien land law by initiative in California.65 Despite the obvious racial
overtones, the Supreme Court rejected the contemporary challenges to the land
laws.66
Racism unquestionably influenced the anti-Asian exclusion in the immigration
laws. 7
The national climate of opinion, pervaded by racism and a burgeoning feeling
of ethnic superiority or what [has been] called the "Anglo-Saxon complex,"
certainly contributed not just to the violence but also to the virtual unanimity
with which the white majority put its seal of approval on anti-Chinese ends
if not means.6"
1. Chinese Exclusion and Reconstruction
Congress passed the first wave of discriminatory immigration laws not long
after the Fourteenth Amendment, which bars states from denying any person
equal protection of law, and other Reconstruction Amendments went into
effect.69 With the harshest treatment generally reserved for African Americans
64. See Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923). For a further discussion of the alien land laws of California and other states, see Edwin
E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CAL. L. REV.
61 (1947), and Dudley 0. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten
Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947).
65. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 658-59 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(describing a "spirited campaign... waged to secure popular approval, a campaign with a
bitter anti-Japanese flavor" resulting in the passage of a land law by initiative in California);
Ferguson, supra note 64, at 62-73 (reviewing the anti-Japanese animus that motivated the
initiative's passage). See generally DANIELS, supra note 5 1, at 100-282 (analyzing the growth
of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States).
66. See supra note 64 (citing cases).
67. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEJNiKOFF E" AL., IMMIGRATION PROcEs§ AND POLICY 2 (3d
ed. 1995) (observing that the Chinese exclusion laws "like many later immigration laws...
were the product of economic and political concerns laced with racism and nativism").
68. DANIELS, supra note 51, at 65 (citing BARBARA MILLER SOLOMAN, ANCESTORS AND
IMIGRANTS (2d ed. 1972)); see MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 227 (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that later anti-Japanese hysteria in California resulted in part from a "belief
in Anglo-Saxon superiority").
69. See TRIBE, supra note 41, § 5-12, at 330; see also John Hayakawa Torok,
Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55 (1996)
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formally declared unlawful, the nation transferred animosity to another discrete
and insular racial minority whose immigration status, combined with race, made
such treatment more socially acceptable and legally defensible!' This issue arose
in the congressional debates over ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment when
a member of Congress declared that Chinese persons could be treated less
favorably than African Americans because "[the Chinese] are foreigners and the
negro is a native."'"
The relationship between Chinese exclusion and the revolutionary
improvements for African Americans during Reconstruction often goes ignored,
even though pre-Civil War state laws regulating the migration of slaves served
as precursors to the Chinese exclusion laws.72 Congress enacted the national
exclusion laws with the support of southerners interested in rejuvenating a racial
caste system as well as self-interested Anglos from California.73
It was no coincidence that greater legal freedoms for African Americans were
tied to Chinese misfortunes. As one historian observed, "[w]ith Negro slavery a
dead issue after 1865, greater attention was focused [on immigration from
China]."7 Political forces quickly reacted to fill the racial void in the political
arena. In California, partisan political concerns, along with labor unionism, in the
post-Civil War period figured prominently in the anti-Chinese movement.75
In 1867 [the year after the Fourteenth Amendment went into effect]
California Democrats launched their offensive against the Chinese. The result
... was a bonanza. The party laid hands on an issue of enormous potential
in its own right-a new issue, uncontaminated by the sad history of the civil
(analyzing how issues surrounding Chinese immigration and immigrants affected the debate
over Reconstruction Amendments).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 266-83 (analyzing psychological theories of
transference and displacement).
71. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1056 (1866) (comments of Rep. Higby). In
discussing why Blacks should be able to naturalize under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Chinese could not, Representative Niblack asked the following:
If a Chinaman is one of the human race, why should he be degraded below the
negro? Why should he not receive the same right as the negro? I should like to
understand it. The negro is of pagan race, and is a pagan before he comes here...
. I want to understand why we should exclude one race and include another, why
we should deny to these people the right of naturalization, for instance, and allow
it to others.
Id (comments of Rep. Niblack). Congress ultimately extended birthright citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment to persons of Chinese, as well as African, ancestry born in the United
States. See Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 485, 491-92 (1987)
(reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985),
and considering congressional debate on this point).
72. See NEUMAN, supra note 48, at 39-40.
73. See MILToNR. KONVITZ, THE ALIENANDTHEASIATIC rN AMERICAN LAW 10-12 (1946).
74. STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT 151 (1969).
75. See generally ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY (2d ed. 1995).
However, while the exclusion of Asian immigrants resulted in a marked decline in violence
directed at Asians in this country, African Americans, who as citizens could not be removed
from the country, were subject to horrible violence well into the twentieth century. See SUSAN
OLZAK, THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIc COMPETITION AND CONFLICT 219-20 (1992).
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war, yet evocative of that entire syndrome of hatreds and loyalties which still
could not quite openly be declared.76
The relationship between the treatment of African Americans and other racial
minorities can be seen in a constitutional landmark of the nineteenth century. In
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, often lauded for its grand pronouncement that
"[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,"" Justice Harlan noted the irony that the
"separate but equal" doctrine applied to Blacks, who unquestionably were part
of the political community, but not Chinese immigrants, "a race so different from
our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the
United States" and who generally are excluded from entering the country.78
Seeking to protect Blacks by denigrating the Chinese, Justice Harlan left no
doubt about his sympathies on the question of racial superiority:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So,
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.79
Some might contend that this analysis fails to recognize that the courts at
various times invoked the law to protect Chinese immigrants. A most prominent
example is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Supreme Court held that
discriminatory enforcement of a local laundry ordinance against. "aliens and
subjects of the Emperor of China" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8" Though often cited for the proposition that a facially
neutral law enforced in a racially disctiminatory manner violates the
Constitution,8 ' the decision, rather than a commitment to racial equality,
represented an early foray by the Supreme Court in invalidating economic
regulation, which reached its high-water mark during the Lochner era.82 In any
event, as the Court's treatment of the exclusion laws reveals, Yick Wo is far from
representative of the prevailing judicial attitude toward the rights of persons of
Chinese ancestry during the late 1800s.
2. Japanese Internment and Brown v. Board of Education
The historical context of the infamous decision to intern Japanese Americans,
as well as Japanese immigrants, during World War II sheds light on the
interrelationship between society's treatment of different minority groups. The
76. SAXTON, supra note 75, at 260 (emphasis added).
77. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a critique of Justice Harlan's so-
called color-blindness jurisprudence, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and
the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1996).
78. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
81. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41, § 16-17, at 1483.
82. See Thomas Wuil Joo, New "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 356 (1995).
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Supreme Court ruling in Korematsu v. United States3 shows how, absent the
protection of law, disfavored racial minority citizens might be treated. In that
case, the Supreme Court allowed U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry, including
some born and bred in this country, to be detained in internment camps. This
decision reveals the inherent difficulties in drawing fine legal distinctions
between noncitizens and citizens who share a common ancestry. In attempting
to defuse the Japanese threat to national security, the U.S. Government refused
to distinguish between noncitizens who immigrated from Japan and citizens of
Japanese ancestry. Lumped together as the monolithic "Japanese" enemy, all
were interned. The U.S. Government classified all persons of Japanese ancestry,
regardless of their immigration status, as "foreign."
As the Japanese suffered from internment during World War II, African
Americans, due in no small part to increased labor demand during the war,
experienced improved employment opportunities and less discrimination.84 As
in the nineteenth century, Asian American exclusion from the national
community was combined with some improvements for African Americans.
The timing of the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, one of the most
well-known equal protection cases of the twentieth century, should not be
ignored. Korematsu (1944) is an infamous case, while Brown v. Board of
Education85 (1954), which vindicated the rights of African Americans, is much
revered. Though close in time, these cases reveal the very best and worst of
American constitutional law. While persons of Japanese ancestry were rebuilding
the remnants of their lives after the turmoil of legally sanctioned internment, 6
African Americans saw hope in being told that "separate but equal" was no
longer the law of the land.
Ultimately, some of the harshest aspects of the anti-Asian laws were relaxed.
Pressures to end exclusion of Chinese immigrants to the United States grew
during World War II as it became increasingly embarrassing for the nation to
prohibit immigration from a valued ally, China, in the war effort. Japanese
propaganda efforts during World War II made much of the Chinese exclusion
laws. 7 In the end, foreign policy concerns, not humanitarian ones, caused
Congress in 1943 to allow China a minimum quota of immigrant visas and to
83. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
84. See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1982, at 12-15 (1984).
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Even closer in time to Korematsu, President Truman in 1948
ordered the desegregation of the armed forces in response to pressures from African American
activists. See generally RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
148-74 (1969) (analyzing political forces surrounding desegregation order); MORRIS J.
MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965, at 291-314 (1981) (same).
86. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
87. See DANIELS, supra note 51, at 186-98; see also J. Donald Kingsley, Immigration and
Our Foreign Policy Objectives, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 299, 303-06 (1956) (analyzing
U.S. foreign policy problems resulting from the exclusion of Asian immigrants).
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allow Chinese immigrants to naturalize." In this way, the United States relaxed
the Chinese exclusion laws for foreign policy reasons similar to those that helped
bring about Brown v. Board of Education.8 9
The Vietnam War also reveals a relationship between Asian subordination and
improvements for African Americans. While the civil rights movement of the
1960s achieved improvements for African Americans, the escalation of the war
in Vietnam during this time was accompanied by the growth of racism directed
at the Vietnamese people, which lingers to this day. 90 Seeing the racial roots of
the war, as well as the impact on domestic people of color, two of the most
prominent African American leaders of their generation, Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Malcolm X, though of different political persuasions, opposed U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.9
As this sad history demonstrates, Asian Americans-whatever their
immigration status and however long they or their ancestors have lived in the
United States-historically have been treated as foreigners in this land.92 Some
claim that the immigration laws discriminate against Asians to this day?3 Besides
88. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (amended 1946); see also Gabriel J.
Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 282-86 (1996) (analyzing foreign policy
reasons for the elimination of the ban on Chinese immigration). In 1945, 109 Chinese
immigrants came to the United States and 233 in 1946. See DANIELS, supra note 51, at 199
tbl.6.3. In 1946, Congress extended similar privileges to Filipinos and Indians. See Act of July
2, 1946, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416 (amended 1952). The Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952
(INA) granted these minimum rights to all Asian nationalities. See Immigration & Nationality
Act, ch. 477, §§ 201(a), 311, 66 Stat. 163, 175, 239 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1151(a), 1422 (West Supp. 1998)).
89. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61
(1988) (contending that U.S. foreign policy interests spurred desegregation efforts in 1950s);
see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) ("[T]he [Brown] decision helped to provide
immediate credibility to America's struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and
minds of emerging third world peoples. At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for
both the NAACP and the federal government And the point was not lost on the news media.")
(footnote omitted); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race,
Resistance, and the Image ofAmerican Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997) (analyzing
relationship between U.S. foreign affairs and civil rights during Eisenhower administration).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming
conviction of the murderer of an Asian American who told victim that he hated the Vietnamese
because his brother had been killed in Vietnam and that the Vietnamese should not have come
to United States); see also Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (enjoining Ku Klux Klan and affiliates from harassing and
intimidating Vietnamese fishermen).
91. See MARABLE, supra note 84, at 111-16.
92. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 429-38 (1996); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-
Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness" and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L.
REV. 261 (1997).
93. See Jan C. Ting, "Other than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law Resultedfrom
and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTs. L. REv. 301 (1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 121-49 (offering
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suffering from efforts to exclude persons who shared their ancestry from the
national community, Asian Americans stood accused of the high crime against
the American "melting pot" mythology of refusing to assimilate?5 Ironically, the
law prevented full assimilation and equal citizenship. For example, due to the bar
to naturalization, immigrants from Asia (as non-whites) were disenfranchised
and prohibited from exercising political power as citizens, which in the long run
detrimentally affected Asian American political involvement.96 Barred from the
political community, Asian Americans were denied the possibility of more fully
assimilating into the mainstream and then suffered criticism for failing to
assimilate.
B. The National Origins Quota System
In 1924, Congress established the much-reviled national origins quota system,
a formulaic device designed to ensure stability in the ethnic composition of the
United States.97 Specifically, the system served to prefer white immigrants. It
initially permitted annual immigration of up to two percent of the number of
foreign-born persons of a particular nationality in the United States as set forth
in the 1890 census.98 In operation, the quota system "materially favored
examples of disparate impact that modem immigration laws have on Asian immigration).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 242-60 (explaining stigma attached to citizens as the
result of exclusion of certain races and nationalities who share similar characteristics).
95. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96-97 (1943) (observing in
Japanese internment case that many factors "prevented [Japanese] assimilation as an integral
part of the white population"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (justifying law excluding Chinese immigration by stating that "[i]t
seemed impossible for [the Chinese] to assimilate with our people"). In this vein, the Supreme
Court refused to allow an immigrant from India to naturalize and become a citizen, and thus
assimilate into the U.S. political community, because he could not assimilate:
It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical group
characteristics of the Hindus render them readily distinguishable from the various
groups of persons in this country commonly recognized as white.... [I]t cannot
be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents would retain
indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry .... What we suggest is merely
racial difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our
people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204,215 (1923).
For a historical analysis of how persons advocating immigration restriction have relied on
the argument that immigrants fail to assimilate, see Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism:
Something Ola Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!
THE NEW NATIvISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (1997).
See also Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "'Ring ofFire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-
American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997) (analyzing barriers to Mexican American
assimilation in the United States).
96. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1300-03 (1993).
97. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11 (a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952).
98. See id. The 1924 Act was a successor to the Immigration Act of 1921, which had a
more liberal quota of three percent of the persons from a particular country as determined by
the 1910 census. See Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5 (repealed 1952). Under
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immigrants from Northern and Western Europe because the great waves from
Southern and Eastern Europe did not arrive until after 1890." Congress enacted
the quota system in the wake of passing the literacy test in 1917; this test
excluded "[a]ll aliens over sixteen years of age, physically capable of reading,
who can not read the English language, or some other language or dialect,
including Hebrew or Yiddish."'" In operation, the test, as intended, restricted the
immigration of non-English speakers, including Italians, Russians, Poles,
Hungarians, Greeks, and Asians.'
A House report offers a clear articulation of the purposes of the national
origins quota system:
"With full recognition of the material progress which we owe to the races
from southern and eastern Europe, we are conscious that the continued
arrival of great numbers tends to upset our balance ofpopulation, -to depress
our standard of living, and to unduly charge our institutions for the care of
the socially inadequate.
If immigration from southern and eastern Europe may enter the United
States on a basis of substantial equality with that admitted from the older
sources of supply, it is clear that if any appreciable number of immigrants
are to be allowed to land upon our shores the balance of racial
preponderance must in time pass to those elements of the population who
reproduce more rapidly on a lower standard of living than those possessing
other ideals."
[The quota system] is used in an effort to preserve, as nearly as
possible, the racial status quo in the United States. It is hoped to guarantee,
as best we can at this late date, racial homogeneity .. ."102
the law, the quota system was based on U.S. population demographics as of 1920 beginning
in 1927. See Immigration Act of 1924 § I 1(b), 43 Stat. at 159.
99. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration
Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1927, 1933 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Chin, supra note 88,
at 279-97 (discussing how quota system limited immigration from Asia). See generally
HIGHAM, supra note 40, at 264-330 (analyzing social forces resulting in passage of
restrictionist quota system). Interestingly, the national origins quota system did not impose
restrictions on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, see Motomura, supra, at 1934,
which was not expressly restricted until much later, see infra text accompanying notes 125-26
(discussing restrictions on Western Hemisphere immigration).
100. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (repealed 1952).
101. See HIGHAM, supra note 40, at 300-30; see also E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at 465-68, 481-83 (1981)
(discussing genesis of literacy test).
102. HUTCHINSON, supra note 101, at 484-85 (emphasis, omissions, and alterations added)
(quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT ON
RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION, H.R. REP. No. 68-350, pt. 1, at 13-14, 16 (1924)); see also ROY
L. GARIS, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION at vii (1927) (expressing similar views and emphasizing
that "our capacity to maintain our cherished institutions stands diluted by a stream of alien
blood, with all its inherited misconceptions respecting the relationships of the governing power
to the governed"). Some in the modem immigration debate have made similar calls for greater
homogeneity among immigrants. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 5, at 232 ("[B]y introducing
diverse populations, [immigration] strikes at the nation-state's Achilles' heel: the need for
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As one commentator remarked approvingly in 1924, the national origins quota
system was "a scientific plan for keeping America American."' 3 Implicit in these
rationales, of course, was the view that persons of northern European stock were
superior to persons of other groups. In a similar vein, the conventional wisdom
was that "[t]he real assimilation of aliens depends to a very large extent upon
their associates after entering-'we can easily assimilate' them 'if their origins
resemble the origins of the people they find when they get here."" ' °
The racial hierarchy endorsed by proponents of the national origins quota
system was entirely consistent with the academic literature of the day, which
viewed the "races" of southern and eastern Europe as inferior to northern
European ones.' In effect, southern and eastern European immigrants,
commonly thought of today as white ethnics, were "racialized" as non-white, and
therefore unworthy ofjoining the national community. 6
A heavy dose of anti-Semitism fueled the demand for the national origins quota
system. Proponents hoped to limit the immigration of Jewish persons to the
United States.' 0 7 This anti-Semitism mirrored the discrimination suffered by
Jewish Americans in this country. 8 During World War II, anti-Semitism,
enforced and reinforced by the quota system, unfortunately influenced the U.S.
Government's refusal to accept many Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust, one
of the tragedies of the twentieth century.'0 9
homogeneity."). But see Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1210-19 (1997)
(contending that personal preferences for the ethnic status quo are not legitimately considered
in immigration law and policymaking).
103. A. Warner Parker, The Quota Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924, 18 AM. J.
INT'L L. 737, 740 (1924).
104. Id
105. See HIGHAM, supra note 40, at 149-56. An influential book in this regard is MADISON
GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (4th rev. ed. 1923). See HIGHAM, supra note 40, at
271 (analyzing nativism's influence on immigration legislation during this period and
observing that "[i]ntellectually the resurgent racism of the early twenties drew its central
inspiration from [this book]").
106. See HIGHAM, supra note 40, at 156-57 (analyzing racial hierarchies popular in science
during that time with Jews and other "non-Nordics" classified as of inferior racial stock). The
racialization of white ethnic immigrants was in no way unprecedented. For example,
mainstream U.S. society classified early Irish immigrants as non-white. See Ronald Takaki, The
Tempest in the Wilderness: The Racialization of Savagery, in DISCOVERING AMERICA 58
(David Thelen & Frederick E. Hoxie eds., 1994).
107. See generally JOHN I-GHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA 81-
174 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1984) (1975) (analyzing impact of anti-Semitism on
immigration restrictions and discrimination against Jews in the United States).
108. See NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 137-
85 (1963). See generally ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMTSM (1991) (analyzing roots of anti-
Semitism around the world).
109. See RITA J. SIMON & SUSAN H. ALEXANDER, THE AMBIVALENT WELCOME 31 (1993)
(summarizing poll data indicating that, in 1939, vast majority of public opposed allowing large
number of Jewish refugees from Germany into United States). See generally HENRY L.
FEiNGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RESCUE (1970) (analyzing the Roosevelt administration's response
to Jewish refugees); SAuL S. FRIEDMAN, NO HAVEN FOR THE OPPRESSED (1973) (studying U.S.
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Other "races" also were affected by the quota system. Although Asian
Americans were excluded from immigrating to the United States well before
1924,1 an oft-overlooked impact of the quota system was that it discouraged
immigration from Africa, historically the source of precious little immigration
to the United States."' This is entirely consistent with anti-Black subordination
in the country and this nation's later refusal to accept refugees fleeing political
turmoil in Haiti, a country populated primarily by persons of African ancestry."'
Despite persistent criticisms, including claims that it adversely affected U.S.
foreign policy interests,"' the Anglo-Saxon, northern European preference in the
immigration laws remained intact until 1965. Congress, though it tinkered
somewhat with the quota system, maintained the quotas in the Immigration &
Nationality Act (INA), the comprehensive immigration law that (as frequently
amended) remains in place today." 4 President Truman vetoed the INA (a veto
that Congress overrode) because it carried forward the discriminatory quota
system." '5 In defending the INA's version of the quota system, one commentator
of the day claimed that the nation's ethnic composition should not be changed
and that, because some known Communists opposed the law, opponents should
be circumspect before joining the fray." 6 A Senate report concluded that the
national origins quota system "preserve[d] the sociological and cultural balance
in the United States," which was justifiable because northern and western
Europeans "had made the greatest contribution to the development of [the]
refugee policy toward Jewish refugees during World War II); GORDON THOMAS & MAX
MORGAN WITTS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED (1974) (documenting U.S. Government's refusal
to accept Jewish refugees on the SS St. Louis during World War II and forcing the ship to
return to Nazi Germany).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 47-82 (analyzing the significance of various laws
designed to exclude immigration from China).
111. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans,
37 How. L.J. 237, 240 (1994).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 179-206 (analyzing U.S. response to Haitian
refugees).
113. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM SHALL WE
WELCOME 52-56 (1953).
114. See INA, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C.A. § 1151(a) (West Supp. 1998)) (providing nations with quotas equal to one-sixth of
one percent of the number of current U.S. inhabitants who traced their ancestry to that country
in 1920).
115. See PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN 441
(1952-53) [hereinafter TRUMAN PAPERS] (explaining veto of INA because it perpetuated
discriminatory national origins quota system and emphasizing that "immigration policy is..
. important to the conduct of our foreign relations and to our responsibilities of moral
leadership in the struggle for world peace").
116. See Robert C. Alexander, A Defense of the McCarren-Walter Act, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 382,385-86 (1956). Some, however, claimed that the public at large opposed the INA,
particularly the national origins quota system. See Harry N. Rosenfield, The Prospectsfor
Immigration Amendments, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 411 (1956). The passage of the
INA in the face of public opposition might be explained by the political strength of an anti-
immigrant minority. See Johnson, supra note 46, at 1158-61 (contending that, due to politics
of immigration, vocal anti-immigrant minority may prevail in political process).
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country" and the nation should "admit immigrants considered to be more readily
assimilable because of the similarity of their cultural background to those of the
principal components of our population.""
7
In sum, the national origins quota system reflects this nation's preoccupation
with its ethnic balance. The system was based on the desire to limit the
immigration of inferior "races" from southern and eastern Europe."' Domestic
discrimination accompanied the exclusion in the laws. Long-standing anti-
Semitism, as well as prejudice against other immigrant groups," 9 existed in the
United States.
The life of the national origins quota system spanned a period when domestic
racial minorities enjoyed some improvements under the law. While domestic
minorities gained formal legal rights, noncitizens at best remained in the same
rightless place in American society. Many noncitizens lost rights with the INA,
which besides maintaining the quota system, also included some draconian
provisions punishing noncitizen political minorities in the name of fighting
Communism. 20
C. Modern Racial Exclusion
In the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' Congress passed the
Immigration Act of 1965. This new law abolished the national origins quota
system" and barred racial considerations from expressly entering into decisions
about immigrant visas;2 4 it also imposed for the first time a ceiling (120,000) on
migration from the Western Hemisphere.'25 Immigration from the Western
117. STAFF OF SENATE CoMm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, REPORT ON THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 455 (1951).
118. This lends support to the concept that race is a social, not a biological, construction. See
generally OMI & WINANT, supra note 27 (analyzing racial formation in the United States).
119. See GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note 108, at 181-218 (documenting the Italian-
immigrant experience in New York City).
120. See John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the
Academy, and the McCarren-Walter Act, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1481, 1489-505 (1988) (analyzing
the history of ideological exclusions in U.S. immigration laws with a focus on INA). See
generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833 (1997) (analyzing how noncitizen political minorities
historically have been treated in a way that would be patently unconstitutional if they were
citizens).
121. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and
42 U.S.C.).
122. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
123. See id, sec. 1, 79 Stat. at 911 (codified as amended at INA § 201, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151
(West Supp. 1998)).
124. See id., sec. 2, 79 Stat. at 911-12 (codified as amended at NA § 202, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1152).
125. See id., sec. 21(e), 79 Stat. at 921 (repealed 1976); see also Rep. Lamar Smith &
Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883,
888 (1997) ("Unfortunately, just as the immigration debate in the 1920s had been unduly
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Hemisphere previously had been restricted not through quotas but through
vigorous enforcement of the exclusion and deportation grounds. The limitation
on Western Hemisphere immigration was part of a compromise to those who
feared a drastic upswing in Latin American immigration.'26 Consequently,
Congress coupled more generous treatment of those outside the Western
Hemisphere with less generous treatment of Latin Americans.
With the demise of the quota system, the racial demographics of the
immigration stream changed significantly.'27 Increasing numbers of immigrants
of color came to the United States.' Not coincidentally, concern with
affected by the rise of nativism, the debate in 1965 was unduly influenced by a very different
movement, that to secure civil rights of all Americans."). Interestirigly, criticism of the
discriminatory nature of the quota system in the House and Senate reports is muted with
emphasis placed on the benefits of the new system rather than the deficiencies of the old. See
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON AMENDING THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 12 (1965) ("In place
of the national origins system the bill establishes a new system of selection designed to be fair,
rational, humane, and in the national interest."); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT ON AMENDING THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 13 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3332 (same). Indeed,
the House report states that "[tihe national origins system has failed to maintain the ethnic
balance of the American population," thereby suggesting that the goal was not necessarily
inappropriate. H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 11.
126. See Motomura, supra note 99, at 1934; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 48 (noting
that the "most compelling reason" for imposing the Western Hemisphere quota was fear of
increased immigration from Latin America resulting from projected population growth); S.
REP. No. 89-748, at 17-18, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3336 (expressing concern
with the level of immigration from Western Hemisphere). The blue ribbon Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy summarized the history:
The United States was... far from free of prejudice.., and one part of the 1965
law reflected change in policy that was in part due to antiforeign sentiments.
Prejudice against dark-skinned people... remained strong. In the years after
World War II, as the proportion of Spanish-speaking residents increased, much
of the lingering nativism in the United States was directed against those from
Mexico and Central and South America ... Giving in to... pressures as a price
to be paidfor abolishing the national origins system, Congress put into the 1965
amendments a ceiling [on Western Hemisphere immigration] to close the last
remaining open door of US. policy.
U.S. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT: U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 208 (1981) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
127. For essays on this subject, see IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY (Barry Edmonston &
Jeffrey S. Passel eds., 1994). Whether Congress envisioned the change in the racial
demographics of immigration has been a subject of debate. See Chin, supra note 88
(contending that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Congress understood the implications of
the 1965 law).
128. See INIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1995
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 23 tbl.D (1997)
[hereinafter 1995 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK] (presenting statistical data showing that the top
five countries of birth of immigrants in fiscal year 1995 were Mexico, the Philippines,
Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and the People's Republic of China).
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immigration, particularly the race of the immigrants, grew over the coming
decades.' 29
Importantly, the abolition of the national origins quota system, though
removing blatant discrimination from the immigration laws, failed to cleanse all
remnants of racism. Various characteristics of the modem immigration laws,
though facially neutral, disparately impact noncitizens of color from developing
nations. The 1965 Act replaced the national origins quotas with an across-the-
board annual numerical limit of 20,000 immigrants from each nation. 30 This
ceiling in operation creates lengthy lines for immigrants from developing nations,
such as Mexico, the Philippines, and India, and relatively short, or no, lines for
people from most other nations. For example, as of March 1998, fourth-
preference immigrant visas (brothers and sisters of adult citizens)' were being
granted to Philippine nationals who applied in April 1978, compared to October
1987 for virtually all other nations.'32 For third-preference immigrant visas
(married sons and daughters of citizens),' the applications of Mexican citizens
filed in May 1989 were being processed in March 1998, compared to September
1994 for applicants from almost every other nation. 3 4 Thus, similarly situated
persons (e.g., siblings and children of U.S. citizens) may face radically different
waits for immigration depending on their country of origin, with accompanying
racial impacts. 3
129. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 5, at 11 (expressing concern with increased
immigration of racial minorities because "[r]ace and ethnicity are destiny in American
politics") (emphasis omitted); RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME
BOMB 76-98 (1985) (expressing fear of immigration of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants who fail
to assimilate).
130. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911-12 (codified
as amended at INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(a) (West Supp. 1998)). Congress changed the
quota somewhat in 1990. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 123-24 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining changes). The per country quotas were not extended
to nations in the Western Hemisphere until 1976. See INA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-571, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 2703, 2703 (codified as amended at INA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1151(a)).
131. See INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(4).
132. See Immigrant Numbers for May 1997, VISA BULL. (Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State, Washington, D.C.), May 1997, at 1, 2.
133. See INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(3).
134. See Immigrant Numbers for May 1997, supra note 132, at 2.
135. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 333 (1993) ("[Tjhe Mexican individual is treated less favorably than his
or her Austrian counterpart, because the per-country limit already subjects immigrants from
high-demand countries to longer waits.") (emphasis in original); Ting, supra note 93, at 308
(contending that per-country caps disparately affect immigrants from Asia, many whom face
long waits to immigrate). Some restrictionists recognize, and in fact embrace, the racial
impacts. See LAMM & IMHOFF, supra note 129, at 21-22 (noting that "[c]ountry ceilings on
legal immigration exist only to ensure that there is a mixture in our migrant stream, that no one
country or group of countries will again dominate the stream to the exclusion of others").
Some might argue that the family reunification policy underlying the INA, see LEGOMSKY,
supra note 130, at 168-70, erroneously favors immigrants from nations with larger families,
which is the case in many developing nations populated by people of color. See ROY BECK, THE
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Other changes to the immigration laws reflect racial concerns. Many have
lauded the Refugee Act of 1980,136 which for the very first time created a general
right to apply for asylum in the United States for noncitizens fleeing political and
related persecution in their homelands.'37 The Act, however, was motivated in
part by a desire to limit the number of Vietnamese refugees accepted by the
United States, whom the President had admitted liberally after the fall of Saigon
in 1975.' The law established numerical limits on refugee admissions and
generally restricted the power of the President to admit refugees, with the hope
of preventing future mass migrations. Years after Congress passed the law,
Vietnamese citizens brought suit charging that the U.S. Government
discriminates against them based on nationality in processing visa applications." 9
Similarly, the immigration laws allow for the exclusion of persons likely to
become public charges, 4 ° an inadmissibility ground given more teeth in 1996
amendments to the immigration laws.'4' The public charge exclusion has a
disproportionate effect on noncitizens of color from developing nations.
4 2
CASE AGAINST IMIGRATION 40-41 (1996); LAMM & IMHOFF, supra note 129, at 192-93; see
also BRIMELOW, supra note 5, at 79-81 (advocating change to family reunification policy).
They claim that this results in "chain migration." However, "[tihe extent to which... 'chain
migration' really takes place is hotly disputed." ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 67, at 191
(citing authorities).
136. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22, and 42
U.S.C.).
137. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 4501 (1980) (comments ofRep. Rodino) (characterizing this
law as "one of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever enacted").
138. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 34 (1981) (reviewing legislative
history of Refugee Act and concluding that "commitment [to numerical limits on refugee
admissions] reflected a growing antagonism within the United States to increased immigration
in general, a feeling crystallized by the very large number of Indochinese admitted into the
country since 1975"); see also GIL LOESC-ER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS
102-69 (1986) (documenting growing public concern from 1975 to 1980 with the large number
of Indochinese refugees resettling in the United States and general fear of mass migration).
139. See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, 104 F.3d
1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (dismissing claims on jurisdictional grounds).
140. See INA § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1998) ("Any alien
... likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.")
141. See Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immigration Act: Affidavits of Support and Public
Benefits, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 317 (1997) (summarizing changes to the public charge
inadmissibility ground in the 1996 amendments to immigration laws).
142. See Charles Wheeler, The New Affidavit of Support and Sponsorship Requirements, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1581, 1590-91 (1997) (noting that certain nationality groups,
particularly Mexicans and Central Americans, will be disparately affected by new income
requirements (125% of poverty level) imposed on sponsors of immigrants by Congress in 1996,
in INA § 213A(f)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1183a(f)(1)) (citing Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann,
Welfare Reform: A New Immigrant Policy for the U.S. (Apr. 1997) (report commercially
available from the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.)). See generally Kevin R. Johnson,
Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender,
and Class, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1509, 1519-28 (1995) (summarizing the history of the public
charge exclusion and deportation grounds and other racial impacts).
For a recent example of alleged discrimination in the granting of visas to noncitizens, see
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Passed before the heated immigration debates of the 1990s, the Immigration
Act of 1990 reflects congressional concerns with the racial composition of the
immigrant stream.'43 The law created a new immigrant visa program that
effectively represents affirmative action for white immigrants, a group that
benefitted from preferential treatment under the national origins quota system
until 1965. "' Congress, in an ironic twist of political jargon, established the
"diversity" visa program, which though facially neutral prefers immigrants from
nations populated primarily by white people. 45 As congressional proponents
envisioned, many Irish immigrated under the program. 46 Indeed, a transitional
diversity program required that forty percent of the visas would be issued to Irish
immigrants.47 In fiscal year 1995, the leading source of immigrants under the
permanent diversity visa program was Poland.
48
In short, the modem immigration laws have disparate racial impacts. As
Professor Howard Chang has observed in a related vein, "[n]ativism ... is not
merely a shameful feature of our past .... Nativism afflicts our politics today,
Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of
State Department consular officer, formerly based in Brazil, who claimed he was unlawfully
terminated for failing to discriminate on basis of visa applicant's race, ethnicity, national origin,
economic class, and physical appearance).
143. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended primarily in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
144. See id., sec. 131, 104 Stat. at 4997-99 (codified as amended at INA § 203(c), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1153(c)); see also Legomsky, supra note 135, at 321 ("[T]he diversity program is
merely the latest in a series of congressional attempts, spanning more than a century, to
influence the ethnic composition of the United States immigrant stream.") (footnote omitted).
145. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 130, at 204-10 (explaining the genesis and operation of
diversity visa program). "Since many more Americans already trace their ancestry to Europe
than to Asia or Latin America, the statutory 'diversity' program is in truth an 'anti-diversity'
program; it causes the resulting population mix to be less diverse than it would otherwise be."
Id. at 210 (emphasis in original); see also Ting, supra note 93, at 309 ("The expansion of
diversity visas as part of the Immigration Act of 1990 reflects continuing Congressional
unhappiness with the predominantly Asian and Latin American character of immigration and
corresponding satisfaction with the success of diversity visa programs in leavening the
immigration mix with more Europeans and other Caucasians."). Before passage of the 1990
Act, Congress tinkered with a pilot "diversity" program. See ALEINmOFF ETAL., supra note 67,
at 130 (noting that the Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 96-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended primarily in 8 and 42 U.S.C.), created pilot diversity visa
program "to ameliorate the steep reduction in European migration that [was a] byproduct of
the 1965 amendments"); Legomsky, supra note 135, at 329-30 '(explaining temporary
predecessors to diversity visa program of Immigration Act of 1990 and explaining how
diversity visas are allocated).
146. Compare Patricia I. Folan Sebben, Note, U.S. Immigration Law, Irish Immigrants and
Diversity: Ciad Mile Fdilte (4 Thousand Times Welcome?), 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 745 (1992)
(recognizing and defending the diversity immigrant program's benefits to Irish), with Walter
P. Jacob, Note, Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics, 6 GEo. IMMIGR.
L.J. 297 (1992) (reviewing the legislative history of 1990 Act, demonstrating how diversity
visas were designed to benefit Irish, and criticizing the program).
147. See 1995 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 128, at 21.
148. See id.
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posing a clear and present danger of new anti-immigrant legislation."'49 The same
is true for racial discrimination in the immigration laws. Other examples bring
this point home.
1. The War on "Illegal Aliens" a/k/a Mexican Immigrants
One cannot fully appreciate the current debate over undocumented immigration
in the United States without understanding how it fits into a long history.
Especially in the Southwest, 50 the immigration laws have helped ensure a
disposable labor force.' For example, during the Great Depression when the
supply of unskilled labor dwarfed demand, Mexican immigrants as well as
citizens of Mexican ancestry were "repatriated" to Mexico at the behest of
governmental authorities. 52 Later, under the Bracero Program in the 1940s and
1950s, an estimated one million Mexican workers were temporarily admitted into
the country to work in agriculture.'
At times, the call for immigration restrictions has been expressly anti-Mexican.
For example, in 1956, the Duke Law School's Law & Contemporary Problems
published an article ironically entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Wetback
Problem,"' 54 which referred to the 1950s as the "wetback decade" and blamed
undocumented immigration from Mexico with "displacement of American
workers, depressed wages, increased racial discrimination toward Americans of
Mexican ancestry, illiteracy, disease, and lawlessness."' Though the term
"wetbacks" has been replaced in today's parlance with "illegal aliens," the
149. Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican
Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2115 (1997) (emphasis in original).
150. See generally ACULIA, supra note 38; CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO (rev.
ed. 1990).
151. See generally MARIO BARRERA, RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHwEST (1979) (analyzing
history of labor control devices used in Southwest). For a summary of the history of Mexican
immigration to the United States and an argument that the United States owes moral
obligations to undocumented Mexican immigrants living in the country, see Gerald P. L6pez,
Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28
UCLA L. REv. 615 (1981).
152. See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRtGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930s, at 98-99 (1995) (analyzing deportation of persons of
Mexican ancestry during Great Depression).
153. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE 218 (1992) (analyzing and criticizing U.S.
Government's role in the program of ensuring control over Mexican labor). For a summary of
the anti-Mexican policies during this period, see Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicle, My
Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicles as Racial History,
34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 435-39 (1990).
154. Eleanor M. Hadley, A Critical Analysis ofthe Wetback Problem, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 334 (1956). The pejorative term "wetback" was commonplace vernacular at the time
and present in legal as well as popular discourse. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1362, 1395 (1953) (lamenting dicta in Supreme Court decision "say[ing], in effect, that
a Mexican wetback who sneaks successfully across the Rio Grande is entitled to the full
panoply of due process in his deportation") (emphasis added).
155. Hadley, supra note 154, at 344.
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modern restrictionist movement plays on remarkably similar-though often
sanitized-themes.
15 6
Despite the fact that undocumented persons come from nations all over the
world, the near exclusive focus of governmental and public attention at the tail
end of the twentieth century has been on undocumented immigration from
Mexico.'57 The racial impact of the recent push to crack down on "illegal aliens"
is unmistakable. 5 Well-publicized border enforcement operations, little
different from military operationg, in El Paso, Texas (Operation Blockade, later
renamed Operation Hold the Line due to protests from the Mexican
Government)'59 and San Diego, California (Operation Gatekeeper)' 60 have been
aimed at sealing the U.S.-Mexico border and keeping undocumented Mexican
citizens from entering the United States.' 6' Indeed, U.S. military forces assisted
the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) in policing the border. 62 At the
same time, reported abuses against Mexican nationals along the border continue
unabated. 63 For example, in 1997, a U.S. Marine on patrol shot and killed a
teenager, Esequiel Hernandez, Jr. (a U.S. citizen who had no criminal record)
while he was herding his family's goats near the border."6 The U.S. General
156. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 5, at 262-63 (expressing similar concerns in arguing
for dramatic reductions in levels of immigration).
157. See 1995 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 128, at 185-86 (estimating that, as
of October 1996, about 54% of the undocumented population was of Mexican origin and that
15 countries contributed 50,000 or more persons to undocumented population in the United
States).
158. For analysis of the importance of language as a tool for rationalizing limitations on the
rights of noncitizens under the immigration laws, see Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S.
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction ofNonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 263 (1996-97).
159. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING
CREDIBILITY 10-19 (1994) (lauding Operation Hold the Line in El Paso and advocating
expansion of this enforcement strategy).
160. See President's Report Reviews Initiatives, "Accepts Immigration Challenge", 71
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1469 (1994) (describing operation).
161. See generally TIMoTHYJ. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MExIcO BORDER,
1978-1992 (1996) (documenting increased militarization of border enforcement).
162. See H.G. Reza, Military Silently Patrols US. Border, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at A3
(reporting on National Guard unit patrolling U.S.-Mexico border).
163. See U.S. COMM'NON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
SOUTHWEST 80 (1997) (reporting on evidence of pattern of violence by Border Patrol);
Amnesty Int'l, United States ofAmerica: Human Rights Concerns in the Border Region with
Mexico (visited May 26, 1998) <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1998/AMR/25100398
.htm> (documenting human rights abuses by INS); see also ALFREDO MRANDE, GRINGO
JUSTICE 100-45 (1987) (analyzing abuses of Chicanos in name of border enforcement); Bill
Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures Available to Victims, 9
GEo. INMGOR. L.J. 757 (1995) (analyzing need for improved complaint procedure for Border
Patrol abuses).
164. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After Marine on Patrol Kills a Teen-Ager, a Texas Border
Village Wonders Why, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, § 1, at 16. An archeologist who knew
Hernandez his entire life commented that "'I'm telling you, the only way they could have
botched this up more was if they shot Mother Teresa. If there was one truly innocent man on
the border, it was this young man. And he's the one who got killed."' Id.; see also Elvia R.
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Accounting Office found that, despite the border enforcement build-up, the
evidence was inconclusive about whether the strategy had proven effective.' 5
Public concern with undocumented Mexican immigration heightened at the
same time that the population of persons of Mexican ancestry grew in the United
States. 66 In return, the resistance of Mexican Americans to anti-immigrant
sentiment represents a fight for status. Similar to the often-heated debate over
bilingual education 67 and crime, 6 restrictionist proposals are but another
battlefield for Anglos and Mexican Americans to fight for status in the U.S.
social hierarchy.
69
Besides conflict over social status, Mexican Americans, and Latinos more
generally, have a self-interest in fighting overzealous border enforcement. In the
fervor to locate and deport undocumented Mexican citizens, Mexican Americans,
often stereotyped as "foreigners" by the national community, may fall within the
enforcement net.'70 In the infamous deportation campaign known as "Operation
Wetback" in 1954, for example, "[t]he Mexican American community was
affected because the campaign was aimed at only one racial group, which meant
that the burden of proving one's citizenship fell totally upon people of Mexican
descent. Those unable to present such proof were arrested and returned to
Mexico."'' Similarly, evidence suggests that provisions of the immigration laws
Arriola, LatCrit Theory International Human Rights, Popular Culture, and the Faces of
Despair in INSRaids, 28 U. MIAN INTER-AM. L. REV. 245,256-62 (1996-97) (relaying human
stories of undocumented Mexican immigrants in INS workplace raids).
165. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-21, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION:
SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY RESULTS INCONCLUSIVE; MORE EVALUATIONNEEDED (1997).
166. See FREDRIC C. GEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA LATINA/LATINO DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BOOK
8-9 tbls. 1-2 to 1-3 (1993) (examining data showing that the population of California was 19%
Latino in 1980 and 25% in 1990, with 80% ofthe Latinos in 1990 identifying themselves as
of Mexican ancestry). The Bureau of the Census has projected that "Hispanics" will be the
largest minority group in the United States by 2005. See Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. of Future:
Grayer andMore Hispanic, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1997, at B16.
167. See generally Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 321 (1987) (analyzing controversy over bilingual education as conflict over status
between Anglos and Latinos).
168. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997) (upholding broad
injunction limiting conduct of Latino "gang" members not convicted of any crime).
169. Cf John Cassidy, The Melting-Pot Myth, NEW YORKER, July 14, 1997, at 40,40 ("The
immigration debate has become a surrogate for arguments about everything from eugenics to
welfare reform to economic growth."). For analysis of the conflict over status and its relevance
to constitutional interpretation, see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution ofStatus, 106 YALE L.J. 2313
(1997).
170. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2
HARv. LATINO L. REV. 101, 117-29 (1997) (analyzing significance of classification of Latinos
as "foreigners"); see also Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinct from Others": Race and
Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1219, 1245-51 (1995) (summarizing history of racialization of Chicanos
in United States).
171. JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK 230-31 (1980); see JULIAN SAMORA, Los
MOJADOs: THE WETBACK STORY 52 (1971) (noting that in "Operation Wetback," "the Border
Patrol launched the greatest maximum peacetime offensive against a highly exploited,
unorganized and unstructured 'invading force' of Mexican migrants").
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that allow for the imposition of sanctions on those who employ undocumented
persons, 72 have resulted in "'a serious pattern of discrimination"' by employers
against persons of Latin American, as well as Asian, ancestry.1
7 3
The historical relationship between subordination of Mexican Americans, a
"foreign" minority, and African Americans, viewed as a domestic minority, is
telling. During the New Deal, while the government scrambled to help citizens
and provided public benefits to citizens who satisfied eligibility requirements,"
Mexican American citizens as well as Mexican immigrants were effectively.
deported to Mexico.' In 1954, the same year that the Supreme Court handed
down the much-lauded Brown v. Board of Education. decision, the U.S.
Government commenced "Operation Wetback," the mass-deportation campaign
directed at undocumented Mexicans.'7 Ironically, the war on Mexican
immigrants, as well as Mexican American citizens, began at the same time that
the formal legal rights of African Americans were finally being recognized. At
that time, it was far from clear that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on which Brown rested even protected Mexican Americans.
78
172. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFOR, supra note 159, at 50-88 (finding current
enforcement of employer sanctions to be ineffective); see also Cecelia M. Espenoza, The
Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1994) (arguing for elimination of sanctions because of their ineffectiveness
and because they have increased discrimination against persons of Mexican ancestry).
173. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-62, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 5-6 (1990) (quoting a nationwide GAO
survey); see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
at iv (1989) (finding "no doubt that the employer sanctions have caused many employers to
implement discriminatory hiring practices"). Such discrimination occurs despite the existence
of provisions prohibiting it. See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324b (West Supp. 1998).
174. See WILLIAM C. BERMAN, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE TRUMAN
ADMINISTRATION 4 (1970) ("Negroes voted for Roosevelt in 1936 and 1940 largely because
their economic deprivation, stemming from unemployment and discrimination, had been
lessened through the work of [the] ... New Deal agencies .... "); see also WALTER I.
TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 249-75 (4th ed. 1989) (summarizing various
social welfare programs developed for citizens during New Deal). Indeed, "in spite of the large
number of white women on [welfare], 'welfare'. . . has become a'... code word' for race. And
the 'typical' [welfare] mother is widely-though erroneously-believed to be an unmarried,
unemployed urban woman of color with many children." Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking
"Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1966 (1993) (omission
added) (quoting Marian Wright Edelman, head of the Washington-based Children's Defense
Fund). This is not to suggest that the administration of welfare during the New Deal was
racially neutral. See FRANCES Fox PIvEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR
133-35 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing racial discrimination by southern states administering the
federal welfare program).
175. See supra text accompanying note 152.
176. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
177. See supra text accompanying note 171.
178. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (reversing finding that Mexican
Americans failed to constitute a cognizable class for equal protection purposes); see also Ian
F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1143 (1997) (analyzing Hernandez in terms of racialization of Mexican Americans in
Texas); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and
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During a period when the law promised (though perhaps failed to deliver) new
legal protections to African Americans, a legally sanctioned deportation
campaign struck with a vengeance at persons of Mexican ancestry.
2. Asylum, Haitian Interdiction, and the Politics of Race
U.S. law and policy toward noncitizens who have fled civil war, political and
other persecution, and genocide in their native lands historically have been
influenced by nativism and racism. Domestic anti-Semitism, for example,
unfortunately contributed to the Roosevelt administration's decision to turn its
back on Jewish refugees fleeing the horrors of Nazi Germany.'79 Congress passed
the Refugee Act of 1980, among more humanitarian purposes, with the hope of
reducing the number of refugees that the President admitted from Vietnam. 8 '
It has not only been race, however, that has influenced U.S. refugee and
asylum policy. Persons from China and Cuba, for example, in the latter half of
the twentieth century received generous treatment from the U.S. Government in
no small part due to foreign policy concerns, namely that the U.S. Government
was at odds with the government of their homelands; admitting refugees from
China and Cuba implicitly condemned their governments. 8 ' The United States
generally denied asylum to Central Americans fleeing regimes with abominable
human rights records that were U.S. allies, while granting relief to Poles fleeing
a harsh communist government at odds with our own.
8 2
Policy conflicts occasionally resulted in confused and inconsistent U.S.
policies. For example, the treatment of Chinese refugees, including many who
claimed persecution because of resistance to China's one-child rule, was erratic
at best.'83 This results from the fact that, while foreign policy interests favored
Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 321, 328 (1997) (analyzing lower court decision in
Hernandez and treatment of Mexican Americans under law as "white" to their disadvantage).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
181. See generally LoESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 138, at 6-84 (documenting how
various presidents employed asylum and refugee decisions to further U.S. foreign policy goals).
182. See Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions,
1991 UTAH L. REv. 279, 343-48 (presenting statistical data reflecting phenomenon); see also
Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum and Discretion, 28 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 751 (1992) (analyzing impact of foreign policy on asylum and refugee decisions);
Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-
First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 28 (1993) (noting that, although Refugee Act "was
hailed as a significant milestone in human rights .... the widely held view [is] that the present
system is politically biased, compromising the intended goal of neutrality").
183. See Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 866-67 (E.D. Va. 1994) (tracing inconsistency in
treatment by U.S. Government of Chinese persons fleeing one-child rule), rev'd without
opinion, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995). Congress in 1996 changed the law to expressly make
persons fleeing such policies eligible for relief. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. §
I 101(a)(42) (West Supp. 1998) (as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3689, which
provides that a person who has been subject to, or fears being subject to, forced abortion or
involuntary sterilization, is deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion and
therefore is eligible for asylum).
1140 [Vol. 73:1111
IMMIGRATION LAW AND RACE RELATIONS
liberal admissions (and thus implicitly condemned China's communist
government), domestic fears militated in favor of numerical limits. The U.S.
Government initially showed sympathy for Chinese refugees.'14 However, fearing
a mass migration from China in the 1990s, the executive branch began to detain
all Chinese migrants who came to the United States on ships, including the much-
publicized Golden Venture in 1993, and to interdict Chinese ships outside U.S.
territorial waters before they reached the mainland.'
Despite the fluctuations on policy, the U.S. Government not infrequently went
to extraordinary lengths to halt feared mass migrations of people of color. It
implemented special detention policies directed at Central Americans and made
concerted efforts to encourage potential asylum applicants to forego their claims
and "voluntarily" depart." 6 No U.S. policy approached, however, the
government's extraordinary treatment of Black persons fleeing the political
violence in Haiti. An oft-ignored fact is that, by stigmatizing African American
citizens, "U.S. immigration policy toward Haiti may harm a historically
disadvantaged group-namely, black Americans. '7
For much of recent history, the U.S. Government generally has supported the
Haitian Government, in large part because the various regimes were stridently
anticommunist.' In stark contrast, both Democratic and Republican
administrations have had notoriously poor relations with Haiti's neighbor, Cuba,
since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. The different relationships visibly
influenced asylum and refugee policy toward persons fleeing the two nations:
Cubans received much more favorable treatment than Haitians." 9
184. See, e.g., In re Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. (BIA) 16 (1989) (granting asylum to Chinese
refugee based on past persecution during Cultural Revolution despite minimal threat of future
persecution).
185. See Ting, supra note 93, at 310-11 (contending that treatment of Chinese immigrants
on Golden Venture and interdiction of Chinese ships represent selective enforcement of
immigration laws to limit Asian immigration); see, e.g., Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1995) (affirming denial of asylum claim of Chinese national apprehended on Golden Venture);
Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
186. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming
permanent injunction barring INS from engaging in a pattern and practice of coercing
Salvadoran noncitizens into signing voluntary departure forms and interfering with right to
counsel); see also ROBERT S. KAHN, OTHER PEOPLE'S BLOOD 209-19 (1996) (documenting
increased use of detention by INS in the 1980s, particularly detention of Central Americans).
187. Motomura, supra note 99, at 1950 (emphasis in original); see infra text accompanying
notes 242-60 (analyzing stigma attached to domestic minorities when immigration law excludes
immigrants sharing similar ancestry).
188. See THOMAS CAROTBERS, IN THENAME OF DEMOCRAcY 183 (1991); see also Jorge I.
Domfnguez, Immigration as Foreign Policy in US.-Latin American Relations, in IMMIGRATION
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 150, 157-58 (Robert W. Tucker et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the
U.S. Government's relationship with Haiti).
189. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of
Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian
Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 12-14 (1993) (analyzing significance of double
standard). This has not always been the case. For example, refugees who came over in large
numbers on the Mariel boatlift were detained with some even facing indefinite detention
because the United States would not admit them, and the Cuban Government would not allow
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In the late 1970s, an increasing number of Haitians in makeshift boats sailed
to south Florida. In 1981, the Reagan administration, to diminish the flow of
refugees and to deter others from following, initiated a program in which the
U.S. Coast Guard interdicted Haitian boats and allowed INS officers to screen
applicants to determine whether they had plausible claims for asylum and
withholding of deportation. 90 Between 1981 and 1991, the Coast Guard
interdicted about 25,000 Haitians. 9"
After the military coup toppled the democratically elected government in
September 1991, the Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on Haiti
and suspended interdiction; in November 1991, interdiction recommenced.' 92 As
a result of the coup, "'hundreds of Haitians [were] killed, tortured, detained
without a warrant, or subjected to violence and the destruction of their property
because of their political beliefs. Thousands [were] forced into hiding." 93 In the
six months after October 1991, the Coast Guard halted over 34,000 Haitians on
them to return. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(upholding indefinite detention of Cuban national who came to the United States in Mariel
boatlift). See generally Richard A. Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion-The Rights of Cuban
Refugees Facing Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925
(1984) (discussing the detention of Cubans arriving since 1980); Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal
Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733
(1989) (summarizing the intolerable conditions Cuban detainees must endure during
confinement). One salient difference between the Mariel Cubans and previous Cuban
immigrants was that many more of the Mariel Cubans were Black. See MARiA CRISTINA
GARCiA, HAVANA USA 68 (1996) (observing that 15-40% of Mariel Cubans were Black
compared to 3% of the 1959-1973 stream of Cuban immigrants). Race thus helps explain the
differential treatment of distinct waves of Cuban immigrants.
In 1994, the U.S. and Cuban Governments agreed to take steps to limit migration from Cuba
to the United States. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 130, at 58-62 (summarizing evolution of U.S.
policy toward persons fleeing Cuba). The United States' willingness to enter the agreement was
influenced by concerns of a mass migration. See id. at 61-62 (observing that nations agreed to
treaty after "new exodus" of"[t]housands of rafters" embarked for the United States).
190. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160-62 (1993) (describing
evolution in U.S. Government's treatment of Haitians during the 1980s and early 1990s).
Under U.S. law, Haitians, once in the country, could have applied for asylum and withholding
of deportation (now known as nonretum). See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1998) (asylum); id. § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (nonreturn). Claims
were made that screening on Coast Guard cutters was insufficient to satisfy obligations under
international law to protect Haitians fleeing persecution. See Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate
of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100
YALE L.J. 2335, 2341 (1991).
For challenges to other policies directed specifically at Haitian asylum-seekers, see Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (reviewing claims of-racial and national origin discrimination and
finding that applicable regulation did not permit such discrimination), Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), affd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding discrimination by INS in processing
asylum claims of Haitians), and Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (finding
to the same effect as Haitian Refugee Center).
191. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 161.
192. See id. at 162.
193. Id. (alterations added) (quoting district court's "uncontested finding of fact").
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the high seas,' 94 which exceeded the number interdicted during the previous ten
years.'9'
To stop the flow of refugees, President Bush in May 1992 began immediately
repatriating all Haitians without screening to determine whether they might be
eligible to remain in the United States.' 96 Despite campaign promises to the
contrary, President Clinton continued Haitian interdiction and repatriation and
forcefully defended the policy against legal challenge.
97
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the executive branch's unprecedented
Haitian repatriation policy.'9 8 The Court did so without squarely addressing the
claim made in an amicus curiae brief of the NAACP, TransAfrica, and the
Congressional Black Caucus that the policy was discriminatory and that the
Haitians were subject to "separate and unequal" treatment.' 99
Besides African American activist groups, others condemned the executive
branch's harsh policies toward the Haitians as race-based. 2' True enough, people
of color from Haiti apparently were the first group of refugees ever singled out
for interdiction on the high seas by U.S. armed forces, as well as for a series of
extraordinary policies.20 ' The issue is complex, however. Cubans, who have
received much more favorable treatment, also are people of color. The executive
branch's foreign policy goals, in addition to race and concerns of a mass
migration, may explain the disparate treatment between Haitians and Cubans. 2
194. See id. at 163.
195. See id at 161 (stating that, in decade after commencement of interdiction in 1981, "the
Coast Guard interdicted approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants") (footnote omitted).
196. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1993), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
197. See Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Says US. Will Continue Ban on Haitian Exodus, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al.
198. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188. In so doing, the Court relied on a version of the plenary
power doctrine. See id. (emphasizing need for deference to President when "construing treaty
and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs") (citing United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
199. See Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
TransAfrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Sale, 509 U.S. 155 (No. 92-344).
200. See Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United States,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 749 & n.12 (1993); Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and
Reparations: A Critique of the United States'Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV.
687, 688 (1993); see also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 451 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (stating that a "possible underlying reason" why Haitians were treated differently than
any other refugees fleeing repressive regimes was that they are Black), affd as modified sub
nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
201. See SARAH IGNATIUS, NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
AsYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 141-66 (1993)
(documenting special policies geared only toward Haitian asylum applicants by INS asylum
officers).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82. This suggests a hierarchy of racial
discrimination in the United States, with the strongest racist sentiment directed at persons of
African ancestry. See Saito, supra note 92 (analyzing racial hierarchy in the United States); see
also Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence 53-
58 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (analyzing Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
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Nonetheless, subtle racism inevitably reduced the potential for significant
resistance to an interdiction program directed exclusively at Haitian refugees. As
law professor Steve Legomsky declared, "' [t]he public would never [have stood]
for this if the boat people were Europeans."' 203 The race, class, language, and
culture of the Haitians, as well as the popular belief that many had the HIV virus,
unquestionably contributed to the domestic resistance to their admission.2"
In the end, asylum-seekers from Haiti, one of the few nations near the United
States with a large Black population, suffered some of the harshest treatment
imaginable from the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court's sanctioning of that
treatment occurred in the aftermath of the violence in Los Angeles after the
Rodney King verdict,2"5 a time when the nation's focus was on building racial
harmony to avoid a repeat of violence in the future.2"6 At the same historic
moment, the nation was striving to improve the place of African Americans at
home while it was excluding Blacks from abroad.
3. Proposition 187 and Race
Race played a prominent role in the passage of California's Proposition 187,
one of the racial milestones of the 1990s. 20 7 To bolster his sagging re-election
campaign, California Governor Pete Wilson capitalized on public dissatisfaction
with immigration by staunchly supporting the initiative. Television
advertisements emphasizing Wilson's unqualified support for Proposition 187
showed shadowy Mexicans crossing the border in large numbers."' Supporters
blamed undocumented Mexicans for California's economic woes that were more
American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, §§ 201-204, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-201 (1997)
(codified in 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1153, 1229b, and 1255 (West Supp. 1998)), which afforded
lawful permanent residency to certain Nicaraguans, Cubans, and others but not to similarly
situated Haitians).
203. James Harney, Critics of U.S. Policy See Racist Overtones, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 1992,
at 2A (alterations added) (quoting Professor Legomsky).
204. See Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking
Political Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 904-15 (1994); see also Peter
Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and Holocaust Refugee Narratives,
6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (1993) (analyzing difficulties faced by Haitian refugees and
comparing their plight to that of Jews who fled Nazi Germany).
205. See generally READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING, supra note 35
(compiling essays analyzing issues surrounding the Los Angeles rebellion).
206. See James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., The Fire This Time: The Genesis of
the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1403, 1418-20 (1993) (summarizing
various initiatives to foster economic development and ease social tensions in south central Los
Angeles).
207. For analysis of the campaign culminating in the passage of Proposition 187, see
Johnson, supra note 34, at 650-72, and for analysis of its impacts, see Johnson, supra note 142,
at 1568-75. See also Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and
the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555 (1996) (analyzing complexity of nonracial
fairness arguments in opposition to Proposition 187).
208. See John Marelius, Wilson Ad Out to Ease Prop. 187 Drumbeat, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 25, 1994, at A3.
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likely attributable to drastic reductions in federal defense spending required by
the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.' 9
Nativist and racist themes inflamed the bitter Proposition 187 campaign. One
initiative sponsor, in a textbook example of nativist sentiment, boldly asserted
that "'[i]llegal aliens are killing us in California.... Those who support illegal
immigration are, in effect, anti-American.""'2 1 An argument favoring the measure
in a pamphlet distributed to registered voters proclaimed that "Proposition 187
will be the first giant stride in ultimately ending the ILLEGAL ALIEN
invasion.'.' One leader in the pro-187 campaign even played on fears that,
unless citizens took steps like the initiative, Mexico might ultimately annex
California."
The public statements of the drafters of Proposition 187 left the unmistakable
imprint of racial animus. One initiative leader conjured up disturbing imagery of
lynching, a device historically used to terrorize African Americans in the United
States: "'[y]ou are the posse ... and [Proposition 187] is the rope.' 2 3 Harold
Ezell, a high-ranking INS official during the Reagan presidency who was loathed
by Latino activists because of his derogatory comments about illegal aliens,2" 4
attributed Proposition 187's widespread support to the fact that "'[ t]he people are
tired of watching their state run wild and become a third world country.'
21 5
Barbara Kiley, mayor of an Orange County town, reportedly described the
children of undocumented immigrants as "'those little f--kers."'2 6 Her husband
209. See, e.g., TONY MILLER, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 8, 1994, at 54 (1994) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET] ("It has been
estimated that ILLEGAL ALIENS are costing taxpayers in excess of 5 billion dollars a year.
While our own citizens and legal residents go wanting, those who choose to enter our country
ILLEGALLY get royal treatment at the expense of the California taxpayer. IT IS TIME THIS
STOPS!") (capitals in original) (Argument in Favor of Proposition 187). The fact that
Proposition 187 placed in jeopardy federal funding of $15 billion, which greatly outweighed
any cost savings, was virtually ignored in the campaign, see id. at 53, a fact suggesting that
other factors besides fiscal ones were at work.
210. Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al (alteration and omission added) (quoting Ronald Prince, head of
the Proposition 187 campaign).
211. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 209, at 54 (capitals in original).
212. See Linda R. Hayes, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, § 1, at 18
(expressing concern that "a Mexico-controlled California could vote to establish Spanish as the
sole language of California, 10 million more English-speaking Californians could flee, and
there could be a statewide vote to leave the Union and annex California to Mexico"). Hayes
was the Proposition 187 media director for southern California. See id.
213. McDonnell, supra note 210, at Al (alteration and omission added) (quoting "initiative
co-founder").
214. See Olga Briseno, Mister Migra Harold Ezell, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 23, 1989,
at Fl (recounting Ezell's "most famous quote" in which "he said illegal aliens should be
'caught, skinned and fried"').
215. Daniel B. Wood, Ballot Vote on Illegal Immigrants Set for Fall in California,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 1, 1994, at 1, 18 (alteration and emphasis added) (quoting
Harold Ezell).
216. Elizabeth Kadetsky, "Save Our State" Initiative: Bashing Illegals in California, 259
NATION 416, 418 (1994) (quoting Barbara Kiley).
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and the initiative campaign's political consultant, Richard Kiley, observed that
the public protests of Proposition 187 were counterproductive because "'[o]n TV
there -was nothing but Mexican flags and brown faces.""'2 " Barbara Coe, a
Proposition 187 supporter, expressed fear of the "'militant arm of the pro-illegal
activists, who have vowed to take over first California, then the Western states
and then the rest of the nation.'
21 8
Election results were polarized along racial lines. White voters supported
Proposition 187 by two-to-one and Latinos opposed it by a three-to-one
margin.2 9 As the racially tinged campaign and racially polarized vote suggest,
Proposition 187, though facially neutral, at its core focused on race. Although
undocumented persons in the United States come from many nations other than
Mexico,220 this never figured prominently in the debate over the initiative.
Moreover, the measure, if implemented, will disparately impact certain minority
communities. Undocumented Mexicans, Mexican American citizens, and citizens
of other minority groups viewed as foreign, including Asian Americans, are the
groups most likely to feel the enforcement sting of Proposition 187.22
To this point, the courts have enjoined the implementation of most of
Proposition 187, with the final disposition of the legal challenges unknown."
Nonetheless, the law triggered national action. In 1996, Congress enacted
welfare reform restricting benefits to lawful, as well as unlawful, immigrants. '
As with the Chinese exclusion laws,224 California blazed a trail for the nation.
217. Margot Homblower Lamont, Making and Breaking Law, TIME, Nov. 21, 1994, at 68,
73 (alteration added) (quoting Richard Kiley).
218. Carol Byrne, Proposition 187's Uproar, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 20, 1994, at
7A (quoting Barbara Coe).
219. See Times Poll: A Look at the Electorate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B2 (describing
exit poll results). Polls taken immediately before the election suggested that the vote would be
much closer than the results proved to be (59% to 41%). The inaccuracy may have resulted
from the fear of some white supporters of being classified as "racists" if truthful to the pollsters.
See, e.g., Ed Mendel, 'The Door Is Open' if Voters Kill 187, Co-Author Warns, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRm., Nov. 4, 1994, at Al (reporting that polls showed that Proposition 187 vote was
dead heat). Racially polarized elections commonly produce a disjunction between polls and
election results. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 734 & n.98 (1991).
220. See supra note 157 (citing statistical data on undocumented population in United
States).
221. See Johnson, supra note 142, at 1571-72.
222. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3418 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 1998); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
223. See supra note 26 (citing welfare reform bill). For a sketch of possible constitutional
infirmities with the elimination of benefits to lawful immigrants, see Michael Scaperlanda, Who
Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1587, 1612-25 (1997). See also Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol & Kimberly A.
Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights
Critique ofImmigration and Welfare "Reform", 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 (1998) (analyzing how
immigration and welfare restrictions violate various international human rights norms).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 47-82.
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Proposition 187 was about much more than immigration. The initiative
represented the electorate's general frustration with changing racial
demographics. While an effort to attack domestic racial minorities with full force
is unsavory politicallyp an all-out war against noncitizens, with the attack being
focused on their immigration status rather than their race, could be pursued.
Proposition 187 thus reflects racial tensions in a way similar to the ever-popular
English-only laws, 6 which have racial impacts because of the link between
language and national origin. Designation of English as the official language,
though facially neutral, directly affects the Latino community?27 It therefore
should not be surprising that the national origins quota system of 1924 came on
the heels of the addition of the English literacy requirement to the immigration
laws in 1917.228 Both constituted parts of an overall package to limit the
immigration of minorities.
Two years after the voters passed Proposition 187, the electorate approved the
California Civil Rights Initiative, which was designed to eliminate affirmative
action by the State of California.229 This followed a University of California
Board of Regents' decision to eliminate affirmative action in student
admissions.' ° Consequently, attacks on racial minorities followed attacks on
immigrants of color.
225. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 194-228 (1991) (contending that
vocal minority on university campuses frequently charge "racism" against professors and
pressure campus administrators to side against professors).
226. See generally RAYMOND TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN? THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH
LANGUAGE MOVEMENT AND THE AMERICAN STATES (1995) (analyzing English-only movement
in United States).
227. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that prosecutors may
lawfully base peremptory challenges against Latinos on ground that they speak Spanish);
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 947 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane) ("[T]he
adverse impact of... the overbreadth [of Arizona's English-only law] is especially egregious
because it is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls almost entirely upon Hispanics
and other national origin minorities.") (citation omitted), vacated as moot, 117 S. Ct. 1055
(1997); see also Stephen W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO
L. REy. 145, 149-53 (1997) (analyzing instances of "language vigilantism" directed at Spanish-
speaking Latinos). See generally BILL PLATr, ,ONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY
INTHE UNITED STATES (1990) (advocating language rights). For analysis of the law analyzing
the speak-English-only rules in the workplace, showing how they reveal Latino invisibility,
legal indeterminacy, and racial dualism, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia
Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
Speak-English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
229. See generally Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.) (holding
that the California Civil Rights Initiative did not violate the Equal Protection Clause), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
230. See Jeffrey B. Wolff, Comment, Affirmative Action in College and Graduate School
Admissions-The Effects of Hopwood and the Actions of the U.C. Board of Regents on Its
Continued Existence, 50 SMU L. REV. 627, 654-57 (1997) (summarizing events surrounding
the University of California Board of Regents' abolition of affirmative action).
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II. LESSONS FROM THE IMMIGRATION LAWS FOR DOMESTIC
MINORITIES
Immigration law offers a helpful gauge for measuring this nation's racial
sensibilities. Long a fixture of immigration law, the plenary power doctrine, a
judicially created immunity for substantive immigration decisions, emphasizes
that the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government enjoy
"plenary power" over immigration matters and that little, if any, room exists for
judicial review. Though consistently criticized, and arguably narrowed by the
Supreme Court, the doctrine continues to represent the law of the land." In this
important way, immigration law has been, and remains to some extent, estranged
from traditional public law, where the Constitution operates in full force.2
At the tail end of the twentieth century, immigration law and policy have
increasingly become a visible hotbed of racial conflict. This section analyzes the
teachings of the plenary power doctrine for domestic race relations.
A. Racial Exclusions in the Immigration Laws Reinforce
the Subordinated Status of Minority Citizens in the
United States
Academic attacks on the plenary power doctrine are legion, coming from many
different angles.233 Some, for example, challenge the fundamental idea
231. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (upholding gender and legitimacy
classifications in immigration laws and recognizing the "limited scope ofjudicial inquiry into
immigration legislation"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding "that
when Executive exercises.., power.., on the basis of a facially neutral and bona fide reason,
the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication
with the applicant").
232. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
1 (1984):
Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably
no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and
judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.... [I]mmigration law
remains the realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and individual
entitlement is at the nadir.
233. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (challenging the Chinese
Exclusion Case from an international law perspective); Linda Kelly, Preserving the
Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community
Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens'Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725, 771-82 (1996)
(advocating that all persons subject to U.S. laws should have constitutional rights and applying
theory to family reunification under immigration laws); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 255 (criticizing
various theories for judicial deference); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 925 (1995)
(analyzing recent plenary power case law and predicting future inroads in doctrine); Victor C.
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underlying the doctrine-that nations have unfettered sovereign power to seal
their borders. T4 Few, if any, modem defenders of the plenary power doctrine can
be found in the legal academy.
Federal plenary power over immigration contrasts sharply with the Supreme
Court's occasional strict scrutiny of state alienage classifications. In Graham v.
Richardson, which invalidated a state welfare regulation, the Court recognized
that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority
... for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 35 This reasoning
would seem to apply with full force to federal regulation.236 However, the
Supreme Court consistently has been deferential to federal alienage
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal
Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 76 OR. L. REv. 425 (1997)
(arguing for more scrutinizing judicial review of federal alienage classifications and
immigration law classifications that affect fundamental rights); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) (rejecting ideas
of inherent and unlimited sovereign power over immigration and calling for constitutional
dialogue on place of noncitizens in national community); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power
Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1155-56 (1995) (examining case law involving
detention of aliens and observing that the "focus on an eroding plenary power doctrine, which
until recently has dominated immigration law scholarship, overlooks the polluting effect of the
plenary power doctrine outside the immigration law realm") (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); Wu, supra note 52, at 43-50 (arguing for abrogation of plenary power doctrine);
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (contending that racial
classifications in immigration laws should be subject to judicial scrutiny).
234. For a sampling of this sort of challenge, see NEUMAN, supra note 48, at 119-22, James
A.R. Nafriger, The General Admission ofAliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
804 (1983), and Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L.
REV. 965. See also Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of
Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 51, 59-89 (1989) (analyzing the
importance, and weaknesses, of sovereignty fiction in immigration law).
235. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938)); see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating prohibition of
noncitizens from state civil service system); see also ELY, supra note 16, at 161-62 (suggesting
that, because aliens are a discrete and insular minority, alienage classifications deserve strict
scrutiny). In contrast to Graham, the Court at times has declined to opt for strict scrutiny
review of state alienage classifications. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)
(upholding state law barring aliens from jobs as public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny and upholding state law requiring police
officer to be a U.S. citizen). Nonetheless, courts occasionally have been willing to find that
state laws in effect regulate immigration and usurp national power in the field and therefore are
preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that federal
law preempted state policy discriminating against lawful permanent residents); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that federal
law preempted core provisions of Proposition 187 because they attempted to regulate
immigration).
236. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 294 ("[I]f alienage is a suspect
classification when made the basis of state regulation, should it not remain suspect when it is
used by the federal government?").
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classifications, just like it has been with respect to Congress's judgments about
substantive immigration admissions criteria. For example, in Mathews v. Diaz,
2 "7
the Court invoked the plenary power doctrine and upheld limits on lawful
immigrants' eligibility for a federal benefits program.
The plenary power doctrine fortunately has not been invoked in recent years
to shield any laws as contrary to this nation's modem constitutional sensibilities
as the infamous Chinese exclusion laws. 23 ' Express racial and national origin
exclusions, which would squarely contradict such icons of the law as Brown v.
Board of Education,2 9 rarely arise in modem immigration law and policy.4 As
we have seen, however, the facially neutral immigration laws of the modem era
have distinctively racial impacts.24'
Assuming that under the plenary power doctrine noncitizens possess few, if
any, constitutional protections with respect to entering the country, the
implications of racial and national origin exclusions on citizens must be
considered. Because the Constitution unquestionably protects the rights of
citizens, citizens claiming injury have a better chance at successfully challenging
the immigration laws than noncitizens directly affected by their operation. Courts
have recognized that citizens in certain circumstances may challenge the
lawfulness of immigration laws because of the impact on their rights.242
Gerald Rosberg focuses on the damage to U.S. citizens sharing the race or
national origin of groups barred from joining the national community:
[A racial or national origin] classification would.., require strict scrutiny,
not because of the injury to the aliens denied admission, but rather because
of the injury to American citizens of the same race or national origin who are
stigmatized by the classification. When Congress declares that aliens of
Chinese or Irish or Polish origin are excludable on the grounds of ancestry
237. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
239. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
240. However, such situations arise occasionally. See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that national origin discrimination against noncitizens from Iran did
not violate the Constitution); supra text accompanying notes 179-206 (analyzing Haitian
interdiction and repatriation). In addition, one could envision a scenario in which Congress
might pass an immigration law that expressly discriminates on the basis of race. See
LEGOMSKY, supra note 130, at 94-96 (setting out hypothetical exercise in which Congress
enacts law limiting immigration from Latin America into the United States because of domestic
racial tensions attributed to growing Latino population).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 121-49.
242. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (refusing, because
Attorney General offered legitimate and bona fide reason not to waive exclusion grounds, to
consider First Amendment interests of those citizens who would have communicated with
noncitizen in United States); Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 n.1 (lst Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is
important to recognize that the only issue that may be addressed by this court is the possibility
of impairment of United States citizens'First Amendment rights through the exclusion of the
alien.") (emphasis added) (citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762); Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp.
1220, 1224 (D. Mass. 1985) ("The lower federal courts have interpreted Mandel to require the
Government to provide a justification for an alien's exclusion when that exclusion is
challenged by United States citizens asserting constitutional claims.") (emphasis added), affd,
845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
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alone, it fixes a badge of opprobrium on citizens of the same ancestry....
Except when necessary to protect a compelling interest, Congress cannot
implement a policy that has the effect of labeling some group of citizens as
inferior to others because of their race or national origin.243
Others also have observed the impacts of racial and national origin exclusions
on citizens. In vetoing the INA,2' President Truman observed that the national
origins quota system was founded on the idea
that Americans with English or Irish names were better people and better
citizens than Americans with Italian or Greek or Polish names. It was thought
that people of West European origin made better citizens than Rumanians or
Yugoslavs or Ukrainians or Hungarians or Balts or Austrians. Such a concept
... violates the great political doctrine of the Declaration of Independence
that "all men are created equal." '245
Similarly, in arguing for the abolition of the quota system, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk recognized that excluding certain noncitizens suggested that "'we
think.., less well of our own citizens of those national origins, than of other
citizens."'246
Brown v. Board of Education247 suggests that racial and national origin
exclusions in the immigration laws adversely affect domestic minorities. In that
case, the Supreme Court relied on social science studies documenting the fact
that segregation of African Americans "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely to be undone." '248 Similarly, exclusion from the country of immigrants
243. Rosberg, supra note 236, at 327 (emphasis added); see also Chang, supra note 102, at
1213 ("[Xenophobia... is inconsistent with equal concern and respect for citizens who may
share the cultural traits that the xenophobe finds disagreeable.") (footnote omitted); Motomura,
supra note 99, at 1947 ("[1Immigration law that excludes members of a particular race or
ethnicity may cast stigma on that group. Unless the government can show a compelling interest,
any such provable stigma violates the bedrock equal protection prohibition against treating any
person as inferior to another by virtue of race or ethnicity.") (footnotes omitted). Such an
approach is consistent with theories of equal protection law that link the level ofjudicial review
to the stigma created by the challenged legislative classification. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257,271-75 (1996) (comparing stigma
approach to equal protection to other theories).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15 (noting that Congress overrode presidential
veto).
245. TRUMAN'PAPERS, supra note 115, at 443.
246. Chin, supra note 88, at 302 (omission added) (quoting Immigration: Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.K 7700 and 55 Identical Bills,
88th Cong. 390 (1964)); see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Philosophy of Our Immigration Law, 21
LAW & CONTEM. PROBs. 358, 358 (1956) ("[National origin] quota provisions were born in
racial prejudice. They give needless offense to many of our citizens and to the people of other
countries; they bedevil the conduct of our foreign relations and add nothing to our public
welfare.").
247. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
248. Id. at 494. The Court cited various social science sources for this proposition. See id.
at 494 n. 11. Though the use of social science in constitutional interpretation, and particularly
in Brown, has been much discussed, often critically, social science influenced the Court's
decisions long before Brown. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 664 n.226.
1998] 1151
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
of color may well "generate[] a feeling of inferiority as to the[] status in the
community"249 of domestic minorities who share a similar racial and national
origin background.
Racial exclusion of noncitizens under the immigration laws, be they express
or covert, reveals to domestic minorities how they are viewed by society. The
unprecedented efforts to seal the U.S.-Mexico border combined with the
increased efforts to deport undocumented Mexicans, for example, tell much
about how a majority of society views Mexican Americans and suggests to what
lengths society might go, if permitted under color of law, to rid itself of domestic
Mexican Americans.2 11 In fact, during the New Deal, Mexican American citizens,
as well as Mexican immigrants, were "repatriated" to Mexico. 25 It therefore is
no surprise that the organized Mexican American community consistently resists
the harsh attacks on immigration and immigrants.252 This is true despite sentiment
among some Mexican Americans to restrict immigration because of perceived
competition with immigrants in the job market. 3
For similar reasons, African American activist organizations protested when
the U.S. Government acted ruthlessly toward poor Haitian refugees facing death
from the political violence gripping Haiti.254 Asian activist groups criticized the
treatment of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s,21' as well as anti-immigrant
sentiment and welfare reforms that adversely affected the Asian immigrant
community.256 These minority groups implicitly understand the link between
racial exclusions and their place in the racial hierarchy in the United States. It is
not just that they share a common ancestry, though that no doubt plays some role
in the formulation of political support. These communities instead understand
that animosity toward members of immigrant minority communities is not just
249. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 150-78.
251. See supra text accompanying note 152. Today, the "deportation" of citizens occurs
most frequently when Mexican citizens with U.S.-citizen children (due to their birth in this
country) are deported; the citizen children, especially younger ones, almost inevitably
accompany their deported parents. See Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the US.A.:
Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1988).
252. See PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS 304-08 (1993) (criticizing Mexican
American leaders' liberal stance on immigration as out of step with rank-and-file).
253. See generally DAVID G. GutiERREz, WALLS AND MIRRORS (1995) (analyzing
restrictionist sentiment in Mexican American community because of, among other things, fear
ofjob loss to low wage labor provided by Mexican immigrants).
254. See supra text accompanying note 199 (discussing amicus brief filed with the Supreme
Court by NAACP and other African American groups in Haitian interdiction case); see also
Hing, supra note 111 (contending that U.S. immigration law's exclusion of immigrants from
Africa sent "messages of exclusion" to African American community).
255. See, e.g., Pamela Burdman, Human-Smuggling Crackdown Reported in Chinese Press,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1993, at A2 (reporting that Asian Law Caucus attorney questioned U.S.
Government's treatment of Chinese asylum-seekers); Gregory Gross & Angela Lau, Mexico
Refuses to Let Chinese Land, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 10, 1993, at Al (same).
256. See Steve A. Holmes, Anti-Immigrant Mood Moves Asians to Organize, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1996, at Al; Lena Sun, Ethnic Groups Unite Against Benefit Cuts, WASH. POST, July
10, 1995, at C1.
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limited to immigrants. In this way, immigration has proven to be a battlefield for
status among Anglos and people of color in the United States." 7
The concerns of minority activists find support in psychological theory, which
suggests that people generally view persons of national origin ancestries other
than their own as fungible. Put differently, in-groups tend to define out-groups
as homogeneous. 28 The out-group homogeneity theory helps explain the
persistence of racial stereotypes.2 9 Many have experienced the homogenizing of
racial minorities in crude and obviously false statements about how all certain
racial minorities "look alike."26 The theory supports the idea that society
generally classifies all persons of Mexican ancestry, for example, as the same
and fails to make fine legal distinctions between them based on such things as
immigration status.
In the end, we must understand that the impact of racially exclusionary
immigration laws does more than just stigmatize domestic minorities. Such laws
reinforce domestic subordination of the same racial minority groups who are
excluded. By barring admission of the outsider group that is subordinated
domestically, society rationalizes the disparate treatment of the domestic racial
minority group in question and reinforces that group's inferiority. Exclusion in
the immigration laws must be viewed as an integral part of a larger mosaic of
racial discrimination in American society.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69 (citing authority analyzing status conflict).
258. See Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social
Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 165 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986)
(summarizing studies on cultural homogeneity theory and elaborating on them in empirical
study); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1192 (1995) ("While ingroup members perceive similarities between themselves and others in
their group, they perceive outgroup members as being even more homogeneous. In other
words, subjects tend to perceive outgroup members as an undifferentiated mass, while ingroup
members are more highly differentiated."); id at 1192 n.133 (citing studies). Krieger offers as
an example a reference by a white supervisor to her Salvadoran client in an employment
dispute as "Mexican," which "tended to show that he perceived Latinos as an undifferentiated
outgroup." Id. at 1192.
259. See Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOc. ISSUES 79, 82 (1969).
260. See Harry H.L. Kitano, Asian-Americans: The Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Pilipinos,
and Southeast Asians, 454 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 125, 126 (1981) (stating that
people "presumel- homogeneity among Asian groups, not only on the physiological level, as
typified by the phrase, 'They all look alike,' but on a cultural level"); see also Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 341 n.100 (1987) (discussing common experience of African or Asian
American "being mistaken for another black or Asian who looks nothing like you (the 'they
all look alike' syndrome)") (citation omitted).
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B. Lessons from Psychological Theory: Why Immigrants
of Color Are Society's Scapegoats
The historical dynamic identified here cannot be marginalized as simply an
"immigration" issue, which is how legal academia often has treated immigration
law. Indeed, immigration law sounds the alarm for racial minorities in the United
States. Efforts to exclude noncitizen minorities from the country under the
immigration laws threaten citizen minorities. An obvious threat is that, if for
whatever reason-narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court, for example-the
protections of the Constitution are limited or eviscerated, domestic minorities
have much to fear.26' The punishment of noncitizens of color suggests just how
society might zealously attack domestic minorities of color absent legal
protections. Korematsu, in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the internment
of citizens as well as noncitizens of Japanese ancestry in the name of national
security, is a stark example.262
Moreover, a relationship exists between society's treatment of domestic
minorities and noncitizens of color. Congress passed the Chinese exclusion laws
not long after ratification of the revolutionary Reconstruction Amendments
designed to protect the rights of African Americans. 263 Korematsu and
"Operation Wetback" came close in time to Brown v. Board of Education.2"4
Haitian repatriation continued at roughly the same time as the "Rebuild L.A."
campaign in the wake of the Rodney King violence? 6' Because of the recurring
nature of such events, it cannot be viewed as a coincidence that they occurred at
the same time but should be considered to be part and parcel of a complex pattern
of racial subordination in the United States.
Psychological theory at times has served as a tool for analyzing the legal
implications of racial discrimination.2 6 In some ways, the reaction to immigrants
261. Indeed, they have much to fear even with legal protections. Legal constraints can only
do so much to constrain anti-minority sentiment. See supra note 16 (noting limits on legal
remedies in facilitating meaningful social change).
262. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see supra text accompanying notes
83-89.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 47-96.
264. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
266. See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 811-14 (1994) (analyzing
psychological theory on unconscious nature of racism in rejecting claim that assailant's race
should be considered in evaluating self-defense claim); Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (analyzing psychological impacts of
microaggressions, subtle put-downs, and slights of minorities); Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133, 135-49 (1982) (analyzing psychological harms of racial insults to racial minorities);
Lawrence, supra note 260 (analyzing how unconscious racism undermines effectiveness of
modem equal protection law, which requires proof of discriminatory intent). For examination
of social psychology literature on anti-immigrant sentiment, see Victor C. Romero, Expanding
the Circle of Membership by Reconstructing the "Alien": Lessons from Social Psychology and
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of color can be explained by the psychological construct known as transference
"in which feelings toward one person are refocused on another."267 Transference
ordinarily occurs unconsciously in the individual.26 ' The general public, in light
of modem sensibilities, often is foreclosed from directly attacking minority
citizens, at least publicly. Society can, however, lash out with full force at
noncitizens of color. In so doing, they contend that the attacks are not racially
motivated but that other facially neutral factors animate restrictionist goals.269
Such attacks amount to transference of frustration from domestic minorities to
immigrants of color.
The related psychological construct of displacement also helps understand the
phenomenon.270 "Displacement" is "[a] defense mechanism in which a drive or
feeling is shifted upon a substitute object, one that is psychologically more
available. For example, aggressive impulses may be displaced, as in
'scapegoating,' upon people (or even inanimate objects) who are not sources of
frustration but are safer to attack."27
Psychological studies show how displaced frustration may unconsciously result
in the development of racial prejudice. 272 For example, one famous study of
displaced aggression found that negative attitudes toward persons of Japanese
and Mexican ancestry increased after a tedious testing session that caused
children to miss a trip to the movies. Animosity was displaced from the test-
givers, immune from attack because of their positions of authority, to defenseless
racial minorities.273
the "Promise Enforcement" Cases 49-59 (Mar. 3, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
267. Thomas L. Shaffer, Undue Influence, Confidential Relationship, and the Psychology
of Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 205 (1970). In psychoanalytic theory,
transference refers to the patient's transference of feelings toward a particular individual to the
therapist. See generally C.G. JUNG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSFERENCE (R.F.C. Hull
trans., 2d ed. 1966).
268. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness Identification, 2 L.
& PSYCHOL. REV. 93 (1976); see also Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of "Unconscious
Transference": The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Sex Offenses,
38 B.C. L. REV. 107, 111-17 (1996) (discussing psychological theory of unconscious
transference in witness identification and distinguishing it from psychological use of the term
"transference").
269. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 207-30 (discussing how supporters of
Proposition 187 claimed that the measure was not racist or anti-immigrant).
270. I readily concede, as Gordon Allport observed in a different context, that "[n]o single
theory of prejudice is adequate." GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 352
(1954). The psychological literature makes clear that a complex interplay of factors contributes
to the development of anti-immigrant sentiment See, e.g., Gregory R. Maio et al., Ambivalence
and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages About Immigrant Groups, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 513 (1996); Gregory R. Maio et al., The Formation ofAttitudes Toward New
Immigrant Groups, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1762 (1994).
271. DAVID KRECH ET AL., ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 768 (2d ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
272. See ALLPORT, supra note 270, at 343-53.
273. See Neal E. Miller & Richard Bugelski, Minor Studies ofAggression: 11. The Influence
of Frustrations Imposed by the In-Group on Attitudes Expressed Toward Out-Groups, 25 J.
PSYCHOL. 437 (1948).
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Such examples square with the history of scapegoating immigrants for the
social problems of the day.274 For example, the U.S. economy went south in the
late 1800s and the frustration was displaced from diffuse economic causes to
Chinese immigrants.175 Gordon Allport offered a most apt example: "Most
Germans did not see the connection between their humiliating defeat in World
War I and their subsequent anti-Semitism. 2 76 Frustration was displaced from
complex real-world causes to a simple-and defenseless-solution.
Transference and displacement serve to hide racial animosity toward all people
of color, not just immigrants of color. Unfortunately, however, an unsatisfied
appetite for homogeneity knows no border between immigrants and citizens.277
Minority citizens as well as minority noncitizens remain a distinct racial minority
whatever the fine legal distinctions made with respect to immigration status. The
popular perception that Latinos" and Asian Americans" are "foreigners" in the
United States, supports this idea.
Transference and displacement also help us better understand interethnic
conflict in the United States.28 Racial minorities all too often fight each other
because their frustration is displaced from white society, too powerful to attack
successfully. Latinos and African Americans, for example, have blamed each
other for their social and economic woes.28' African Americans and Asian
Americans have done the same.282 Though understandable, this displaced
animosity obscures the fact that dominant society, which is fighting to maintain
274. See ALLPORT, supra note 270, at 243-59; see also id. at 346-47 ("[I]t is not economic
advice that rules immigration policy, but rather the felt frustrations of citizens who rightly or
wrongly think an immigration iron curtain will protect them in their search for status.")
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 69-82.
276. ALLPORT, supra note 270, at 352.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 258-60 (discussing out-group homogeneity thesis).
Along similar lines, Alex Aleinikoff has expressed fear about the difficulties of ensuring that
the United States include lawful immigrants in the national community when efforts are made
to exclude undocumented immigrants. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of
Membership, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915 (1995). The difficulty of cabining such sentiment
is demonstrated by the fact that, not long after the California voters passed Proposition 187 to
limit the availability of public benefits to undocumented persons, see supra text accompanying
notes 207-30 (discussing Proposition 187), Congress enacted welfare "reform" denying public
benefits to lawful immigrants, see supra note 26 (citing legislation).
278. See supra text accompanying note 170.
279. See supra text accompanying note 92.
280. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 57-63 (analyzing how interethnic conflict is symptomatic
of larger racial and social problems).
281. See generally BILL PIATT, BLACK AND BROWN IN AMERICA (1997) (analyzing African
American/Latino conflict and advocating cooperation).
282. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1581, 1584-85 (1993) (analyzing how media and other portrayals of African American and
Korean American conflict in Los Angeles reflected dominant society's racial views); Reginald
Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between
Korean andAfrican Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15 (1993) (analyzing conflict.along class
as well as racial lines).
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the racial status quo, is the true culprit. This insight suggests the importance of
efforts to resolve interethnic conflict and build constructive coalitions between
communities of color to challenge discrimination." 3
Cognitive dissonance theory, under which the human mind attempts to
reconcile conflicting ideas,284 also helps explain how dominant society pits
subordinated peoples against one another. Being generous to one racial minority
allows one to rationalize the harsh treatment of other minorities and offer a
facially neutral explanation, such as the group's failure to assimilate, its deficient
work ethic, that its members speak a foreign language, or that members of the
group entered the country in violation of the immigration laws. As Cass Sunstein
observed,
[t]he beneficiaries of the status quo tend to ... conclud[e] that the victims
deserve their fate, that they are responsible for it, or that the current situation
is part of the intractable, given, or natural order.... [P]eople who behave
cruelly change their attitudes toward the objects of their cruelty and thus
devalue them. Observers of cruelty and violence tend to do the same. The
phenomenon of blaming the victim has clear cognitive and motivational
foundations. The notion that the world is just, and that existing inequalities
are deserved or desired, plays a large role in forming preferences and beliefs.
All these phenomena played an enormous part in the history of racial and
sexual discrimination.
2 5
A number of other psychological and sociological theories offer some
explanatory role for the relationship between domestic and foreign
subordination.2"6 The theory of status conflict focuses on conflicting groups
fighting for status in the country.2 7 Competition theory sees various ethnic
groups, including whites, Asian Americans, and African Americans, competing
for scarce economic and social resources.288 Though these and many other
theories of race relations differ in important ways, each considers the whole of
social relations as opposed to focusing on the particular misfortune of one
283. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence
of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 828-47 (1995) (analyzing benefits and impediments
to multiracial coalition building); Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical
Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to
Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 30 n. 118 (1996) (advocating "sophisticated approach to
coalitional efforts").
284. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIvE DISSONANCE (1957)
(hypothesizing that when confronted with internally inconsistent ideas, a person will try to
reduce cognitive dissonance by avoiding situations and information that would likely increase
the inconsistency).
285. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 759-60 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
286. For a discussion of various psychological theories that help explain racial conflict, see
Sylvia R. Lazos, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant
Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1998).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69 (explaining concept of status conflict in
connection with the English-only movement in the United States).
288. See generally OLZAK, supra note 75 (applying theory to explain an empirical study




minority group at a time. This lesson should not be lost on those analyzing anti-
immigrant sentiment and domestic race relations.
CONCLUSION
This Article traces the historical relationship between subordination of
domestic minorities and noncitizen minorities. Those serious about social change
must engage and contend with these complex interrelationships for a better
understanding of the operation of subordination in the United States. Because
racial subordination is part of a cohesive whole, it cannot be fully appreciated by
focusing on one aspect as separate and apart from the dynamic social context.
As seen in the instance of interethnic conflict, the complex interrelationship
suggests the need to build coalitions between subordinated communities seeking
to end subordination.2 9 In the past, conflict between different minority groups-
be it between Black and Latino, Black and Asian, or some other-has contributed
to the maintenance of the status quo. Conflict has hindered the building of
coalitions necessary to dismantle the entrenched racial hierarchy.
But, if change is not forthcoming, what is one to extrapolate from the past in
predicting the future? We can expect crackdowns on immigrant minorities at
times when minimal improvements are seen by domestic racial minorities.
Foreigners, like sacrifices to the gods, are the price for domestic minorities to
achieve marginal improvements in their plight. The psychological dynamics work
together to buttress the status quo and ensure maintenance of the racial hierarchy
in the United States.
For better or worse, the history of national origin and racial exclusion in U.S.
immigration laws serves as a lens into this nation's soul. By considering the
nationalities and racial minorities that a society seeks to exclude from the
national community, we better understand how that society views citizens who
share common characteristics with the excluded group. This phenomenon is not
limited to racial minorities, but applies with equal force to other groups who have
been excluded from our shores under the immigration laws, including political
minorities, the poor, women, lesbians, and gay men.2 90 Disadvantaged in the
United States means multiply disadvantaged under the immigration laws.29
Transference of hate and displacement of frustration from one racial minority
to another explain much in the heated racial dynamics of the twentieth century.
Cognitive dissonance theory also teaches us how the nation can be so harsh to
noncitizens of color while claiming that racism is dead in America. As
immigration continues to change the complexion of U.S. society, we
unfortunately can expect more of the same. One can only wonder what the
289. See supra text accompanying note 283 (discussing building of multiracial coalitions).
290. For analysis of different subordinated groups' attempts to achieve full citizenship rights
in this country, see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989).
291. Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (analyzing intersection of
race and gender in subordination of women of color).
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constant striving for homogeneity292 means for the future, as racial diversity in
the United States increases and the Anglo-Saxon ideal becomes less a possibility
and more a distant, perhaps nostalgic, memory. Indeed, we are left with a
terrifying vision into the heart of darkness. Are we robots? Insects?293 In
pondering the future, the question posed by Richard Delgado---"The Coming
Race War?"--becomes all the more ominous.294
292. For critique of the Anglo-Saxon homogeneity assumption underlying U.S. law
generally, see Lazos, supra note 286. See also Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric
Enterprise, 15 LAw & INEQ. J. 323 (1997) (analyzing Eurocentric nature of law and its use as
instrument of cultural domination in the United States).
293. See George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation, and the Law: A Philosophical
Perspective (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
294. RiCHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? (1996).
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